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EXILE ON MAIN STREET: COMPETING 
TRADITIONS AND DUE PROCESS 
DISSENT 
COLIN STARGER* 
Everybody loves great dissents.  Professors teach them, students learn 
from them, and journalists quote them.  Yet legal scholars have long 
puzzled over how dissents actually impact the development of doctrine.  
Recent work by notable empirical scholars proposes to measure the 
influence of dissents by reference to their subsequent citation in case law.  
This Article challenges the theoretical basis for this empirical approach 
and argues that it fails to account for the profound influence that uncited 
dissents have exerted in law.  To overcome this gap in the empirical 
approach, this Article proposes an alternative method that permits 
analysis of contextual and inter-textual aspects of doctrinal development.  
This method proceeds by dividing doctrinal territories into rival schools 
of thought and then constructing opinion genealogies for each competing 
school.  Connections between opinions—majority, concurring, and 
dissenting—are justified using both citation and more nuanced 
hermeneutic analyses.  Through systematic tracking of debate between 
rival schools over generations, the impact of dissents is revealed in the 
turns taken during unfolding doctrinal argument. 
Using this method, this Article examines two key Due Process 
territories—economic liberty and “incorporation”—and demonstrates 
how uncited Supreme Court dissents dramatically changed the course of 
these doctrines.  First, it is demonstrated that uncited dissents by Joseph 
Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases and by Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
Lochner v. New York directly contributed to the well-known rise and fall 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; NYU Law School, 
2007–2010.  J.D., Columbia Law School, 2002.  This Article was produced with the support of 
a University of Baltimore Summer Research Fellowship.  The opinion maps in this Article 
were rendered using custom software implementing the author’s information design.  I am 
profoundly grateful to Darren Kumusawa, who created the software architecture and worked 
tirelessly on its implementation.  Thanks also to C.J. Peters, Garrett Epps, Brandon Garrett, 
Jennifer Laurin, Peter Markowitz, Dave Jaros, Chris Fabricant, and participants in the NYU 
Lawyering Colloquium for their generous insight and critique on prior drafts.  Of course, 
errors herein are entirely mine. 
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of economic liberty.  Second, the momentous battle over incorporation is 
proven to have dramatically turned under the influence of uncited dissents 
by John Marshall Harlan in Hurtado v. California and Hugo Black in 
Adamson v. California.  The incorporation story features analysis of 
John Paul Stevens’ final, passionate dissent after thirty-five years on the 
Court, which came in the 2010 blockbuster Second Amendment 
incorporation case, McDonald v. City of Chicago.  Apparent 
contradictions in this critical opinion are resolved by connecting Stevens’ 
dissent to the tradition of uncited great dissents that forever changed 
substantive due process doctrine. 
To illustrate the results of its method, this Article introduces an 
innovative series of “opinion maps” that graphically represent the 
competing due process genealogies in economic liberty and incorporation 
doctrine.  Rendered using custom software designed by the author, the 
opinion maps present information-rich, epic-scale historical portraits of 
these key constitutional doctrines.  The maps have practical and 
theoretical use.  Practically, they offer accessible guides to the place of and 
relationships between major opinions in two crucial substantive due 
process debates.  Theoretically, the figures rendered collectively suggest 
deep metaphors for the interpretative space we call doctrine and for the 
vital role dissents play in drawing lines of authority that define the shape 
and boundaries of this interpretative space. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I wish a lawyer would measure the development of law by 
dissents,—which are worth more study than is usually accorded 
them.  In a court not subject to sudden change, able and continued 
dissent delimits and accentuates decision; it reveals far more than 
does the majority opinion the intellectual differences of the 
council table; and the present status of police power is to me more 
clearly revealed by the dissents of Justice Holmes than by the 
syllabi of digests. 
Judge Charles Merrill Hough1 
 
When Judge Hough made these remarks in an annual lecture at 
Cornell University in the spring of 1918, Oliver Wendell Holmes’ now 
celebrated Lochner v. New York dissent—decrying the Court’s striking 
down of maximum-hours legislation for bakers in New York—had been 
on the books for thirteen years.2  Despite this passage of time, Judge 
Hough emphasized Justice Holmes’ contemporary influence over due 
process debates and liberally quoted aphorisms from his Lochner 
dissent.3  Hough’s enthusiasm is understandable.  By 1918, Holmes’ 
dissents appeared to have persuaded some justices seated at the council 
table to change course.  Just one year prior to Hough’s lecture, the 
Court had handed down Bunting v. Oregon, which upheld against a due 
process challenge maximum-hours legislation regulating millers.4  This 
result flatly contradicted Lochner’s vision of due process protecting 
individual economic liberty and appeared to embrace a Holmesean 
jurisprudence authorizing health and welfare regulations as legitimate 
exercises of police power. 
 
1. Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law—To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 231 (1919). 
2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  In this 
Article, I introduce Supreme Court justices by their first names.  Since Supreme Court 
opinions do not specify Christian names, I have located this information using the remarkable 
A Visual History of the Supreme Court of the United States, published by Timeplots 
[hereinafter SCOTUS VISUAL HISTORY].  For a fully searchable electronic version of this 
document, see A VISUAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
(2010), http://timeplots.com/scotus/. 
3. See Hough, supra note 1, at 232 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)).  Among Holmes’ now legendary aphorisms cited by Hough were “a ‘constitution 
is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,’” and “the ‘Fourteenth Amendment 
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social statics.’”  Id. 
4. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). 
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Yet this happy tale of a righteous dissent’s redemption is deceptive.  
Although Holmes’ view did eventually prevail, charting the actual path 
of triumph reveals the difficulty inherent in any Houghian project 
aspiring to “measure the development of law by dissents.”5  Consider 
the approach of notable empirical scholars who advocate measuring the 
influence of dissents over doctrine by reference to their subsequent 
citation.6  An exclusively citation-based approach would apparently 
conclude that Holmes’ dissent played no role in Lochner’s famous and 
definitive overruling by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish in 1937.7  This is 
because Holmes’ Lochner dissent was cited exactly zero times in the 
West Coast Hotel majority opinion and zero times in the authorities 
relied upon by the majority.8  However, I regard this absence of citation 
more as evidence of a methodological limitation in this empirical 
approach than as proof that Holmes’ dissent failed to contribute to the 
demise of Lochnerism.  Despite the absence of citation, a direct line 
unquestionably connects the West Coast Hotel majority opinion to 
Holmes’ Lochner dissent twenty-two years earlier.  The trick is figuring 
out just how to draw this line. 
In this Article, I attempt to measure how dissents shape the 
development of doctrine while attending to vexing line-drawing 
problems like connecting Holmes’ dissent to the ultimate repudiation of 
Lochner.  My specific focus is on dissents in the realm of due process, 
and my approach draws on a hermeneutic understanding of the 
interplay between text and tradition.9  I posit Supreme Court opinions—
 
5. Hough, supra note 1, at 231. 
6. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) 
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 17 (U. Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 510 (2d series), Jan. 2010) (citing James H. Fowler et al., Network 
Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1542834 (“We 
assume that the more citations to an opinion, the greater its influence is likely to be in shaping 
the law . . . .”). 
7. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. 
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)).  Although West Coast Hotel only explicitly overruled 
Adkins, the Court has recognized that “West Coast Hotel . . . signaled the demise of Lochner 
by overruling Adkins.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992) 
(internal citations omitted). 
8. Holmes’ dissent was not cited in a Supreme Court opinion until a 1948 free speech 
case.  See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“If ‘the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics,’ neither does it 
enact the psychological dogmas of the Spencerian era.” (internal citations omitted)). 
9. Hermeneutics refers to the theory and practice of interpretation, particularly the 
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majority, concurring, or dissenting—as specific textual instantiations of 
competing traditions within due process doctrine.  These competing 
traditions express and advance the teachings of rival schools of thought 
regarding the constitutional meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  I argue that dissents can keep particular 
traditions of constitutional interpretation alive when forced into exile by 
shifting majorities on the Court. 
My argument finds visual representation through a series of 
“opinion maps” that trace lineages of certain antagonistic schools of due 
process tradition.  Figure 1 below10 demonstrates the concept behind the 
opinion map by charting our introductory example.  It presents Holmes’ 
Lochner dissent as one opinion point in a bloodline that extends from 
Justice Samuel Miller’s majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases11 
all the way forward to Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes’ majority 
opinion in West Coast Hotel.  Each triangle represents an opinion; the 
case name appears above the opinion and the opinion author appears 
below.  The map’s X-axis shows the year an opinion issued while the Y-
axis supplies the number of votes cast in support of the opinion—all 
points above the dashed line are thus majority opinions.  Solid arrows 
joining opinions indicate that the latter opinion directly cited the earlier 
one.  Dotted arrows indicate a hermeneutic connection that I argue 
exists in tradition notwithstanding the absence of formal citation. 
 
interpretation of texts.  Originally concerned with the interpretation of ancient and sacred 
texts in light of classical and religious tradition, hermeneutics now extends well beyond its 
original theological and legal confines to embrace larger philosophical problems of 
understanding and meaning.  See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 
(Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (seminal work on 
philosophical hermeneutics).  The legal academy has an established tradition of viewing 
jurisprudence and doctrine through a hermeneutic lens.  See, e.g., Brian Bix, H.L.A. Hart and 
the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REV. 167 (1999).  For an excellent recent 
collection of law review articles concerning hermeneutics, see GADAMER AND LAW (Francis 
J. Mootz III ed., 2007). 
10. The remaining Figures in the text of the article are in black and white.  The 
Appendix contains color images of all Figures save for Figure 4.1. 
11. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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The genealogical metaphor suggested by the maps in this Article 
echoes the familiar practice of referring to “lines” of cases or to a 
leading case “and its progeny.”  However, I refine the usual metaphor 
by mapping the relationships between opinions rather than between 
cases.  Opinions have authors, which unlike faceless attribution to “the 
Court,” directly imply personal agency and the ideological commitments 
of individuals.  Opinions in these maps are represented as triangles that 
either point up or down.  All of the triangles in Figure 1 thus point down 
since the opinions in this line did not find an economic right (or, if 
written in dissent, would not have found an economic right).12 
 
12. Conversely, the triangles in Figure 2—representing the competing tradition 
supporting economic liberty—all point up because they represent opinions favoring the 
 
Figure 1. 
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Although I critique empiricists’ over-reliance on citation as a means 
of measuring a dissent’s influence, I recognize the primacy of direct 
citation in establishing connections between lines of opinions.  As Figure 
1 demonstrates, my method leans heavily on solid arrows—indicating 
direct citation—to establish essential links between opinions such as 
Slaughter-House and Holden, or Holden and Holmes’ dissent in 
Lochner.  However, I also argue that citation is not the only way to 
“connect the dots” when measuring a dissent’s influence.  I thus draw 
dotted arrows between opinions that are hermeneutically connected 
despite the absence of formal citation.  I call these connections 
hermeneutic because they require interpretation of surrounding 
doctrinal context and tradition.  Figure 1 thus posits that Holmes’ 
Lochner dissent was relied upon, but not cited by, the majority in 
Bunting and the dissents in Adkins.13 
My original theoretical claim is that dissents can profoundly affect 
the development of doctrinal tradition without ever being cited.  To 
prove this claim, I examine two specific areas of due process doctrine—
economic liberty and “incorporation”—where uncited dissents exercised 
profound influence over doctrinal development.  Though uncited, these 
dissents did not go unread.  Dissents provided context for majority text.  
The first four featured dissents in this Article—by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in Lochner,14 Joseph Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases,15 
Hugo Black in Adamson v. California,16 and John Marshall Harlan in 
Hurtado v. California17—all provided alternate readings of authority that 
ultimately changed the course of substantive due process doctrine.  The 
last dissent featured—also the final dissent by John Paul Stevens after 
thirty-five years on the Court, in McDonald v. City of Chicago18—seeks 
to replicate the remarkable success of such great dissents in steering 
substantive due process.  Exiled on the main street of Supreme Court 
 
existence of economic due process rights.  See Fig.2, infra p.1273. 
13. Proof of this proposition is offered below.  See infra Part II.A. 
14. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
15. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111–24 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  See 
infra Part II.B. 
16. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  See infra 
Part III.A. 
17. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538–58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See infra 
Part III.B. 
18. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  See infra Part III.C. 
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reporters, great dissents create interpretative spaces for future 
generations.  The opinion maps rendered in this Article suggest a visual 
metaphor for these interpretative spaces and for the competing lines of 
opinions charting paths through them. 
My methodological contribution is a new technique for studying 
doctrinal development.  This technique fills a gap in the empirical 
approach that fails to account for the profoundly inter-textual nature of 
doctrine and consequently overlooks the influence of uncited dissents.19  
My technique derives from a traditional understanding of doctrine as 
territory usefully divided into competing schools of thought.  By 
constructing opinion genealogies and carefully recording the votes 
secured by each opinion, I suggest a systematic way to track the 
changing fortunes of rival schools.  By tracing debates between 
competing schools over generations, I conceptualize doctrinal evolution 
as an unfolding argument.  Dissents define the boundaries of the debate; 
they push and pull the argument in new directions.  To measure the 
development of law by dissents is to note precisely when and how the 
argument turned because of dissent.  This demands close reading of 
opinion texts and a hermeneutic method that is more multi-layered and 
less mechanical than empirical techniques.  Ultimately though, this 
method is equally rigorous and analytical, and facilitates deeper insight 
into the text and context of discrete doctrinal territories. 
Using this method, I conduct thorough inquiries into two vital areas 
of substantive due process doctrine—economic liberty and 
incorporation.  The genealogies produced and mapped offer epic-scale 
historical portraits of the development of these key constitutional 
doctrines.  In addition to contributing to substantive due process 
scholarship, the portraits also enrich understanding of the history of 
dissent.  Legal scholars have previously observed that Supreme Court 
dissents were rare from the time Chief Justice John Marshall introduced 
the “opinion of the Court” in 1801 up until the 1930s–1940s.20  They have 
described this early period as embracing a “norm of consensus” and 
have hotly debated the precise cause of the norm’s demise21 and its 
 
19. The critique of the empirical approach is developed in Part II infra. 
20. See Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence 
Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 (2008) (citing Robert Post, The Supreme Court as 
Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1356–59 (2001)); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and 
Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 321–23. 
21. Compare Guinier, supra note 20, at 20–21 (“The 1925 Judiciary Act consolidated the 
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normative implications.22  The maps and genealogies presented in this 
Article present an important refinement to the understanding of the 
consensus norm.  Specifically, the unflagging persistence of dissents in 
due process doctrine since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868 show that competing due process traditions were not silenced by 
any norm of consensus.  As explained, the fight over due process is 
literally a fight over the past and future of tradition.23  This is the great 
genius of the concept of due process—its doctrinal connection to 
tradition. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts.  In Part II, I consider the existing 
literature on dissents and describe my place within it.  Here I develop 
my critique of the empirical method of citation counting as a means to 
measure the influence of dissents, and I offer a defense of traditional 
doctrinal inquiry.  While legal scholarship has and will continue to be 
profoundly enriched by techniques and theories drawn from other 
academic disciplines, I argue that advancing the understanding of law 
will always require careful reading of its primary texts and attention to 
the context of its competing traditions.  This justifies a hermeneutic 
approach. 
After this theoretical development, I turn to my concrete examples.  
In Part III, I examine the economic due process doctrine introduced 
above.  Here I argue that two sets of largely uncited dissents greatly 
influenced the rise and fall of economic liberty.  From the Court’s first 
 
practice of petitioning for certiorari, which drastically reduced the Court’s caseload and 
heightened its discretion.  These changes unlocked the restraints on dissent, and the unanimity 
norm buckled under the new conditions of judicial review.” (footnote omitted)), with 
Henderson, supra note 20, at 325–26 (citing Thomas Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise 
of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. POL. 361, 362, 364–65 (1988) 
(attributing the sudden decline in the “consensus norm” to the Chief Justiceship of Harlan 
Fiske Stone and specifically rejecting the Judiciary Act of 1925 thesis)).  
22. There was once a flourishing debate and academic literature on whether dissents 
improperly undermined or properly advanced the rule of law.  See generally Laura Krugman 
Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307, 308–10 (1988) 
(describing the debate and collecting articles from late-Nineteenth through the mid-
Twentieth century).  This normative debate largely subsided, or at least narrowed, over the 
past decades as commentators have grown accustomed to high rates of dissent on the Court.  
See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV 447, 468–71 (2008) 
(making normative argument against practice of dissenters clinging to losing views in 
“perpetual dissents”).  However, current-Chief Justice John Roberts’s stated goal of 
decreasing the number of dissenting opinions may have rekindled this controversy.  See, e.g., 
Guinier, supra note 20, at 15 (citing Roberts’s push for fewer dissenting opinions as raising 
normative questions about the conflict between unanimity and democratic accountability). 
23. See infra Part II. 
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occasion to interpret the new Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, authority divided into two 
schools seeking to control the Clause’s doctrinal meaning.  I maintain 
that the school favoring a strong due process right, which largely 
dominated the Court from the turn of the century until West Coast Hotel 
in 1937, derived from the tradition established by the uncited dissent of 
Justice Joseph Bradley in Slaughter-House.  For the opposing school, I 
suggest that Holmes’ Lochner dissent played an instrumental role in the 
ultimate demise of liberty of contract despite its formal absence in West 
Coast Hotel.  Since Lochner’s rise and fall is familiar territory, the 
doctrinal tour in Part III is relatively brief and focused on illustrating the 
essential contours of my hermeneutic model of dissent through a well-
known example. 
In Part IV, I take an in-depth look at a lesser-known due process 
debate that burned hot in the 1940s–1960s but seemed all ashes until the 
2010 blockbuster, McDonald v. City of Chicago, rekindled former 
flames.24  The debate turns on the question of “incorporation”—whether 
the substantive protections of the federal Bill of Rights can be applied 
against the states via the Due Process Clause.  By the time of the Civil 
War, it was settled that the Bill of Rights only protected individuals 
against the Federal Government.25  After the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, however, a new school favoring incorporation of the Bill 
of Rights against the States recognized potential textual ammunition in 
that amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Part IV begins by examining the genealogy of the school favoring 
incorporation in detail.  I show how Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality 
opinion in McDonald, which applied the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear handguns against the States, as recognized in 2008’s 
controversial District of Columbia v. Heller decision,26 relied on an 
incorporation tradition that stretches all the way back to Justice John 
Marshall Harlan (I)’s dissent in an 1884 case called Hurtado v. 
California.27  Justice Hugo Black later reinvigorated the tradition 
initiated by Harlan in a series of remarkable dissents from the 1940s that 
 
24. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032–36 (2010) (recounting 
earlier debate over incorporation). 
25. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
26. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
27. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538–58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see 
also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114–27 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. 
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605–17 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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prevailed two decades later.28  The essential claim here is Harlan and 
Black’s dissents exerted influence over the pro-incorporation school in a 
manner that far exceeded their limited citation by opinions in this line. 
This Part then turns to a competing doctrinal tradition that generally 
opposed incorporation.  Justice John Paul Stevens ostensibly embraced 
this anti-incorporation tradition in his final passionate dissent on the 
Court in McDonald.29  At first blush, Stevens’ embrace seems strange 
because this anti-incorporation tradition explicitly rejected expansion of 
criminal procedure rights that Stevens himself undoubtedly welcomed.  
However, a hermeneutic analysis helps resolve this tension.  I argue that 
Stevens’ dissent should not be read literally as defense of the anti-
incorporation school but rather should be understood instead as a 
stirring final lecture for future generations on the proper meaning of 
substantive due process doctrine writ large. 
In the concluding Part, I consider how dissents, in addition to 
shaping internal development of doctrine, also seek to construct 
external borders between rival due process territories.  Here, I reflect on 
how lessons learned about the impact of dissents on due process 
doctrine might apply more broadly and explore the implications of this 
study on general theories of dissent. 
II.  DISSENT, CITATION, AND TRADITION 
Legal scholars who advocate a citation-based approach to measuring 
the influence of legal opinions upon doctrine proceed from solid 
premises.30  After all, legal arguments turn on authority and citation 
provides the formal mechanism to introduce authority into legal texts.  
Every first-year law student quickly learns that it is tantamount to a 
 
28. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68–92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). 
29. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30. Drawing on political science work in this area, empirical legal scholars are the most 
prominent advocates of a strong citation-based approach in the legal academy. See, e.g., 
Epstein et al., supra note 6, at 17 (citing Fowler, supra note 6, at 324); Richard A. Posner, The 
Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 534 
(1994) (book review) (advocating counting citations as method for measuring influence based 
on use of such method to measure scholarly influence).  Non-empirical scholars have also 
embraced the approach.  See Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical 
Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784 n.11 (2000) (positing a minimum of ten subsequent 
citations “as a baseline for canonical status”).  I have previously advocated counting citations 
to make “a prima facie case” about an opinion’s influence.  See Colin Starger, The DNA of an 
Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1072 n.129 
(2009). 
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cardinal sin in legal writing to assert that a legal rule applies without 
citing authority.  Initiation into the Bluebook’s esoteric and dreaded 
maze of citation forms is an infamous rite of passage into the legal 
fraternity.  Citation clearly matters enormously.  On the surface of 
things, measuring an opinion’s influence by the number of times it has 
been cited seems entirely sensible. 
Yet this citation-counting heuristic suffers from shortcomings that 
become especially acute when undertaking to measure the influence of 
dissents.  Consider first that counting citations is potentially both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive as a measure of an opinion’s influence 
over doctrine.  Inclusivity problems initially stem from the premium 
placed in our system of precedent on recent cases.  Supreme Court 
opinions may garner citations not because they contain particularly 
insightful discussions of a legal proposition, but simply because they 
mark the latest affirmation of that proposition developed in a longer 
line of opinions.  That older opinions get cited less than newer ones does 
not automatically mean that the newer cases exert more sway over 
current doctrine.  In addition to complications caused by preference for 
“fresh precedent,” an under-inclusivity problem potentially plagues 
dissents because dissents lack formal precedential value.  While citation 
generally builds the authority of a legal argument, citation to dissents 
risks undermining the authority of the argument.  The incentive not to 
cite dissents is strong, and a dissent may influence doctrine far more 
than its number of citations would indicate. 
Beyond inclusivity problems, a problem we might call “loss of 
context” presents the deeper theoretical obstacle to the citation-
counting method.  In legal texts like Supreme Court opinions, every 
citation does not have equal weight or value in the larger argument.  
Some citations may provide the only authority for discrete but hotly-
contested propositions.  Other citations may come in strings and stand 
for abstract and entirely uncontroversial principles.  The plethora of 
introductory signals (see, accord, etc.) available to characterize the 
relationships between propositions and their supporting authority 
signify a range of meanings in citation not captured by any flat counting 
technique.31  Context matters when reading text.  Not all cites share an 
 
31. See generally THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 54–55 
(Colum. L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). 
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equal influence value.  Citation quantity alone therefore cannot measure 
the quality of influence.32 
This critique is not offered to suggest that citation is unimportant.  
Rather, the argument is ultimately against an exclusively citation-based 
approach to measuring the influence of dissents upon doctrine.  Here, it 
is worth recalling that the English word “doctrine” literally derives from 
the Latin doctrina meaning teaching and corresponds to the word 
disciplina meaning learning.33  Just because Supreme Court Justices do 
not cite an opinion frequently (or at all) does not mean that they have 
not read it, learned from it, or become convinced to follow its teaching.  
Similarly, an opinion that has not been cited by the Court in over fifty 
years may still provide the canonical understanding of an area of law.  
That understanding is simply transmitted through other venues—
textbooks, treatises, law review articles, etc.  Rather than rely 
exclusively on citations in Supreme Court opinions, a more sensitive 
approach admits evidence of influence from the diverse texts and 
contexts that constitute doctrinal tradition. 
The mapping method explored in this Article explores one such 
more sensitive approach.  My approach initially borrows from an older 
line of scholarship that highlighted the vital role dissents play in 
 
32. Some scholars have devised deeply sophisticated quantitative systems that offer 
considerably more nuance than a simple “add ‘em up” counting approach.  For example, 
drawing on both network and Internet search theories, Professor Fowler and his colleagues 
measure the “legal importance” of Supreme Court cases based on number of times that an 
individual case is cited by other cases (inward citations) and by the number of citations the 
individual case makes to other cases (outward citations).  See Fowler et al., supra note 6, at 
328–30.  The method is dynamic and iterative because inward and outward relevance scores 
depend on the relevance scores of the other cases in the network, which change over time.  Id. 
at 328.  While ingenious quantitatively, this technique remains hermeneutically flat.  The 
authors simply use Shepard’s Citations to “identif[y] each instance in which one of the 
Court’s majority opinions referenced a previously decided Court majority opinion.”  Id. at 
328.  They do not distinguish between citation signals, do not track the proposition a case is 
cited for, and do not score how important the citation is to the larger argument.  While these 
omissions are entirely understandable (it would be well-nigh impossible to code a 26,681 case 
network at this level of detail), it does render the technique less than useful for tracking the 
influence of a case upon specific doctrine.  Moreover, the Fowler et al. study actually omits all 
dissenting opinions from its network analysis, which renders it incapable of speaking to the 
influence of dissent on doctrine. 
33. PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 136 (1986).  As Professor Goodrich observes, “Doctrine consists 
of the truths handed down by educators—by priests, judges, politicians, scholars and so on—
all of whom are experts in the classics, custodians of ancient truths which are preserved for 
and presented to their contemporary audiences.”  Id. 
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sustaining competing constitutional traditions.34  I therefore assume that 
doctrine can be usefully divided into competing schools.  This 
assumption is historically justified as scholars have long recognized that 
the federalist and anti-federalist debates that led to the adoption of the 
Bill of Rights were carried on by successive generations of doctrinal 
antagonists who still fundamentally differed over the limits of state and 
national power.35  Of course, the various and competing schools of 
doctrinal thought evolved and mutated as our turbulent history 
unfolded—but every generation nonetheless inherited allegiances and 
insights from prior traditions taught, learned, and handed down.36  
Dissents have long served both to transmit the teachings of exiled 
traditions and also to steer old traditions in new directions. 
The centrality of competing traditions in my understanding of 
doctrinal dialectics justifies a specific focus on due process dissents.  Due 
process provides an advantageous point of departure because of the 
doctrine’s self-conscious concern with the very concept of tradition.  The 
Court has variously explained due process as protecting “the ‘traditions 
and conscience of our people,’”37 “‘traditional notions of fair play and 
 
34. In a wonderful article published in 1894, Hampton Carson vaunted dissenting 
opinions as “the best exposition to be found in the books of the views of two contending 
schools of constitutional interpretation” and as interesting “because of the importance of the 
doctrines contended for, and the way they have been woven into the warp and woof of our 
jurisprudence, to become in time of controlling importance in determining the pattern of the 
texture.”  Hampton L. Carson, Great Dissenting Opinions, 50 ALB. L.J. 120, 121 (1894–1895).  
In more recent years, scholars have by and large neglected this well-pedigreed approach to 
dissent. 
35. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original Understanding 
of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV 2053, 2063–66 (2004) (describing Federalist 
and anti-Federalist debates that led to Bill of Rights); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original 
Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable 
Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1261–62 (1989) 
(“[T]he historical record reminds us that it was the opponents rather than the supporters of 
the Constitution who fought hardest for the addition of a bill of rights . . . .”).  Given this 
history, one might imagine the Bill of Rights as a kind of “dissent” to the original “majority 
opinion” of the Constitution. 
36. Evolutions and mutations in schools of thought occur in politics as well as doctrine.  
Though they bear the same names, today’s Democrats and Republicans are markedly 
different from the Democrats and Republicans of 1960 or of 1860.  Just as the poles defining 
the political landscape have changed since the founding, so too have the poles of legal 
doctrine.  Nonetheless, Hampton Carson’s description in 1894 of “two contending schools of 
constitutional interpretation” battling over “the expanding empire of national Federalism and 
the shrinking reservation of State sovereignty” continues to capture an essential dynamic in 
modern constitutional debates.  See Carson, supra note 34, at 121. 
37. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320–21 (2009) (quoting Medina 
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substantial justice,’”38 and rights “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.’”39  Invoking tradition in this context is no accident—the 
very phrase “due process of law” has an ancient origin tracing to Latin 
in the Magna Carta of 1215, influentially translated by Sir Edward Coke 
in the 17th Century.40  The rich legal history behind “due process” 
fundamentally implicates “those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.”41  Debates 
over due process contest the soul of our legal tradition. 
Yet these debates also reveal that our legal tradition is not 
monolithic.  We no more share a single inherited tradition than we do a 
single morality.42  Due process majorities and due process dissents have 
always responded to the same Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but they have staked competing claims to the interpretation of its 
 
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
38. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added). 
39. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). 
40. See WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE 
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 375 (2d ed. 1914) (stating original Latin text from Chapter 
39 of the 1215 Magna Carta translated as “[n]o freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or 
disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or [and] by the law of the land”).  While modern scholars tend to refer to the Magna 
Carta, see generally id., early commentators generally referred to “Magna Charta” (with no 
definite article).  See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521–28 (1884) (analyzing 
interpretations of the Latin phrase “per legem terræ” in “Magna Charta”).  In this Article, I 
employ the modern usage.  Though Sir Edmond Coke was not the first to interpret the key 
phrase “per legem terræ” (by the law of the land) to mean “due process of law,” his 
translation directly influenced early American understandings of the phrase.  See Robert E. 
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 958–59; see also, e.g., Hurtado, 
110 U.S. at 521–28. 
41. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
42. The connection between tradition and morality is fundamental.  Tradition provides 
the ultimate authority and justification for morality.  As Hans-Georg Gadamer argues in his 
classic study of hermeneutics:  
 
That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is 
nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of 
what has been handed down to us—and not just what is clearly grounded—always 
has power over our attitudes and behavior. . . .  The real force of morals, for 
example, is based on tradition.  They are freely taken over but by no means created 
by a free insight or grounded on reasons.  This is precisely what we call tradition: 
the ground of their validity. 
GADAMER, supra note 9, at 281–82. 
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tradition.  Writing in dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan (II) once 
described due process as a balance: 
 
[T]he balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well 
as the traditions from which it broke.  That tradition is a living 
thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs from it 
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has 
survived is likely to be sound.43 
 
Harlan’s definition of due process is certainly contested,44 but his 
description of the dynamic between past and present perfectly captures 
a hermeneutic understanding of tradition. 
Hermeneutics generally concerns the relationship between parts and 
whole in discourse.  This relationship is mutually constitutive and 
creates meaning.  Take a simple example.  The meaning of a sentence 
depends on the sense of its component words.  Yet the meanings of 
individual words themselves depend on the sentence in which they 
appear.45  Text informs context and context informs text.  Scholars call 
 
43. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan’s specific 
target in Poe was a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives, which Harlan 
argued violated a right to “privacy of the home” protected by the Due Process Clause.  See 
generally id. at 548–55 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Four years after Poe, the Court struck down 
Connecticut’s law banning the use of contraceptives.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
485–86 (1965) (finding statute violated a “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older 
than our political parties, older than our school system”).  Notably, Harlan concurred in 
Griswold’s judgment but did not join the majority opinion because of objections to its 
“incorporation” approach.  See id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).  Harlan’s 
views on incorporation are explored infra Part III.C. 
44. Harlan’s analysis in his Poe dissent fairly defines the “living tradition” school of 
substantive due process methodology.  See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3090, 3096 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring allegiance to this approach).  The 
competing school employs a more strictly historical approach to understanding substantive 
due process.  See id. at 3057 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disputing living tradition approach).  The 
Court has long debated whether Harlan’s approach states the current doctrine.  Compare 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 n.4 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining 
how the Court has adopted Harlan’s Poe result and reasoning), with id. at 721 n.17 (Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist conceding that Harlan’s dissent had influence, but denying that its 
reasoning exclusively controls substantive due process doctrine).  This debate continued in 
McDonald.  See generally infra Part III. 
45. See GADAMER, supra note 9, at 291 (“We know this from learning ancient 
languages.  We learn that we must ‘construe’ a sentence before we attempt to understand the 
linguistic meaning of the individual parts of the sentence.  But the process of construal is itself 
already governed by an expectation of meaning that follows from the context of what has 
gone before. . . .  [T]he movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part 
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this back-and-forth between parts/whole, words/sentence, and 
text/context a hermeneutic circle.46  The concept of a hermeneutic circle 
applies well in legal discourse as it describes the relationship between 
individual opinions and the collective doctrine they form.47  The 
meaning of an opinion depends on the doctrinal context from which it 
emerges.  Yet an opinion also reads past doctrine, interprets its 
meaning, and advances its understanding.  Opinions thus modify the 
doctrine they interpret.  Successful opinions—including dissents—
change the course of living tradition and liberate it from dead custom.48 
The due process opinion maps in this Article reflect this 
hermeneutic dynamic.  After identifying competing traditions within the 
due process arenas of economic liberty and incorporation, the genealogy 
for each rival school is rendered separately.  Though I have selected 
which members of the doctrinal family appear in each genealogy, solid 
arrows linking opinions derive from the opinions’ own genealogical 
account—their citations.  Note that arrows between opinions point 
backwards from “child” to “parent.”  This both reverses the traditional 
direction of arrows seen in human genealogies and points toward the 
limits of the genealogical metaphor.  Quite obviously, legal opinions do 
not have two biological parents and they are not born as helpless infants 
that must grow and mature before they can reproduce.  Rather, opinions 
appear in discourse fully formed and intelligent—much like Athena 
leaping from the head of Zeus. 
Yet unlike even mighty Athena, legal opinions actually choose their 
own ancestry.  Opinions literally define their place in doctrine by 
 
and back to the whole.”). 
46. For a thorough discussion of the hermeneutic circle, see id. at 291–94. 
47. Cf. Larry A. DiMatteo & Blake D. Morant, Contracts in Context and Contracts as 
Context, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 549, 560 (2010) (arguing that “contract law can be 
understood as a thick texture of rules and doctrines that form a hermeneutic circle—one that 
poses the paradox that the whole cannot be understood without understanding the parts and 
the parts cannot be understood without comprehension of the whole.”). 
48. Professor Berman has described a similar dynamic as endorsing historicity over 
historicism, and tradition over traditionalism.  See Harold J. Berman, The Historical 
Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 18–19 (2005).  Berman writes:  
 
Historicism is the return to the past; historicity emphasizes the element of 
continuity from past to future in the development of the culture of a society, 
including its legal culture.  In the words of a distinguished contemporary historian, 
“Tradition is the living faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the 
living.”   
Id. (quoting JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (1984)). 
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including or excluding ancestral opinions when reciting their own 
genealogy.  An opinion may cite dozens of cases for various 
propositions contained within it.  The pool of potential parents is large.  
Singling out the pertinent ancestral lines requires close reading of text 
and, where an opinion keeps mum about its true parentage, of 
surrounding context and tradition.  It is in the realm of uncited 
ancestry—dotted arrows in the opinion maps—that dissents often 
quietly exert their influence. 
Before turning to our first concrete study, I want to emphasize that 
the opinion maps presented here do not purport to depict the whole 
doctrine in question.  The maps are not the territory.  A vast universe of 
texts has affected each of the territories of due process doctrine 
explored.  The point of the maps is not to provide exhaustive detail, but 
rather to sketch the main lines of the competing doctrinal schools.  To 
deploy another analogy, the maps presented are like maps of 
constellations.  From a sparkling universe of opinions, I draw lines 
between the best and brightest stars.  Like constellations, the real power 
in the connections drawn lies less in the raw images than in the stories it 
allows the observer to tell. 
III.  DUE PROCESS AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
The debate over a due process right to economic liberty implicates 
one of the most infamous constitutional crises in American history.  
During the early days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal, the 
Supreme Court blocked economic legislation on due process grounds, 
relying on Lochner and its progeny.49  The oft-repeated tale of FDR’s 
infamous court-packing plan launched in response to the Court’s 
perceived intransigence and of Justice Owen Roberts’ fabled “switch in 
time that saved nine” in 1937’s West Coast Hotel decision need not be 
revisited here.50  Rather, the story I want to tell is of two dissents and 
their powerful impact upon the competing “substantive due process” 
(hereafter “SDP”) lines of economic liberty doctrine.  These two 
dissents—by Justice Bradley in 1873’s Slaughter-House and by Justice 
Holmes in 1905’s Lochner—respectively, contributed to this doctrine’s 
 
49. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the 
Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 299, 299–302 (Michael C. 
Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
50. For an excellent recent account, see NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES 
AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 103–21 (2010). 
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rise and fall, and yet went uncited within Supreme Court opinions in the 
line.  This Part argues for their proper places in the genealogy. 
The battles in this territory generally pitted health and welfare 
regulations enacted pursuant to state police power against individuals 
who opposed these regulations as interfering with their economic 
liberty.  Supreme Court opinions in the tradition favoring police power 
and opposed to a strong right to economic liberty are represented in 
Figure 1.  Figure 2 below shows opinions from the rival tradition that 
advocated for a strong right to economic liberty to curb state police 
power.  Justice Holmes’ Lochner dissent appears in the middle of Figure 
1 while Justice Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent appears on the left 
side of Figure 2.  Both dissents have only dotted arrows pointing to 
them.  After presenting the raw genealogical data underlying Figures 1 
and 2, this Part first examines Holmes’ dissent in Lochner and then 
Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House and justifies their asserted 
connection to the traditions within which they are pictured. 
All SDP opinions theoretically interpret the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868.  In practice, SDP opinions 
usually interpret SDP precedent to judge whether a state has 
“deprive[d] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.”51  Unlike the incorporation doctrine considered in the next Part, 
the debate over a SDP right to economic right to liberty, or at least the 
narrower “liberty of contract” debate, is largely defunct.52  For that 
reason, the opinion maps here have relatively few data points. 
Figure 1 depicts opinions that found no protected “liberty” interest 
“deprive[d]” by state regulations at issue.  In chronological order, the 
opinions in this line are: the Slaughter-House Cases (Justice Samuel 
Miller for the Court, 1873);53 Holden v. Hardy (Justice Henry Brown for 
the Court, 1898);54 Lochner v. New York (Justice Oliver Wendell 
 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
52. Although some scholars have suggested that economic substantive due process has 
been born again, see, e.g., Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the 
Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397, 397–98 & nn.1–2 (1993–1994), the fact remains that that 
precedent set by West Coast Hotel has not been challenged in any meaningful way.  Westlaw’s 
KeyCite records no negative authority at all regarding West Coast Hotel. 
53. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).  Slaughter-House was a 5–4 
decision.  Justice Samuel Miller wrote the majority opinion.  See id. at 57.  Justice Stephen 
Field dissented, with Chief Justice Salmon Chase, Justice Noah Swayne, and Justice Joseph 
Bradley joining.  See id. at 83, 111 (Field, J., dissenting).  Justice Bradley also wrote a 
separate, solo dissent.  See id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
54. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).  Holden was a 7–2 decision.  Justice Henry 
Brown delivered the opinion of the Court.  See id. at 380.  Justice David Brewer and Justice 
 
16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:10 PM 
1272 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1253 
Holmes dissenting, 1905);55 Bunting v. Oregon (Justice Joseph McKenna 
for the Court, 1917);56 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of 
Columbia (Justice William Howard Taft dissenting, 1923);57 Adkins 
(Justice Holmes dissenting, 1923);58 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 
(Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes for the Court, 1937).59  In 
genealogical order, the direct citations in this line are: West Coast Hotel 
(Hughes)→ Adkins (Taft) + Adkins (Holmes);60 Adkins (Taft)→ 
Bunting (McKenna);61 Lochner (Holmes)→ Holden (Brown);62 Holden 
(Brown)→ Slaughter-House (Miller).63  The gaps in direct citation of this 
 
Rufus Peckham dissented without opinion.  See id. at 398. 
55. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Lochner was a 5–4 decision with Justice 
Rufus Peckham writing for the majority.  Id. at 52.  Holmes authored a solo dissent.  Id. at 74–
76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Justice John Marshall Harlan (the first) wrote a dissent in which 
Justices Edward White and William Day concurred.  See id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
56. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).  Bunting was a 5–3 decision with Justice 
Joseph McKenna writing for the majority.  Id.  Chief Justice Edward White and Justices 
Willis Van Devanter and James McReynolds dissented without opinion.  Id. at 439.  Justice 
Louis Brandeis took no part in the decision.  See id. 
57. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  Adkins was a 5–3 decision.  Justice 
George Sutherland penned the majority opinion.  Id. at 539.  Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft wrote a dissent in which Justice Edward Sanford concurred.  Id. at 562, 567 (Taft, C.J., 
dissenting).  Justice Holmes wrote a separate solo dissent.  Id. at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
Justice Brandeis took no part in the decision.  Id. at 562. 
58. Id. at 567 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  For Adkins’ vote break-down, see supra note 57. 
59. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  West Coast Hotel was a 5–4 
decision with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes writing for the majority.  Id. at 386.  Justice 
Sutherland wrote a dissent on behalf of himself and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and 
Pierce Butler.  Id. at 400–01 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
60. See id. at 390–91 (citing fact of Adkins dissents); id. at 395–96 (quoting from Taft and 
Holmes dissents); id. at 396–97 (same); id. at 397 (“We think that the views thus expressed [by 
Taft and Holmes] are sound and that the decision in the Adkins case was a departure from 
the true application of the principles governing the regulation by the State of the relation of 
employer and employed.”). 
61. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 563 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) (“The right of the Legislature under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to limit the hours of employment on the score of the 
health of the employee . . . has been firmly established.”); id. at 563–64 (discussing Bunting as 
evidence of this principle and stating that Bunting overruled Lochner sub silentio). 
62. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“It is settled 
by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in 
many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious . . . and which . . . interfere with 
the liberty to contract.”); id. (“The decision sustaining an eight-hour law for miners is still 
recent.” (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898))). 
63. Holden, 169 U.S. at 398 (“We are of opinion that the act in question [i.e., an eight-
hour day for miners] was a valid exercise of the police power of the State . . . .”); id. at 382 
(citing Slaughter-House as upholding validity of monopoly “as a proper police regulation for 
the health and comfort of the people”). 
16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:10 PM 
2012] EXILE ON MAIN STREET 1273 
genealogy that require arguments are therefore: Adkins (Taft) + Adkins 
(Holmes) + Bunting (McKenna)→ Lochner (Holmes). 
Figure 2 depicts opinions that favored an individual’s economic 
rights over state police power.  In chronological order, the opinions in 
this line are: Slaughter-House (Justice Joseph Bradley dissenting, 
1873);64 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. 
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. (Justice 
Bradley concurring, 1884);65 Allgeyer v. Louisiana (Justice Rufus 
 
64. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 111 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
For Slaughter-House’s vote break-down, see supra note 53. 
65. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-
 
Figure 2. 
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Peckham for the Court, 1897);66 Lochner (Justice Peckham for the 
Court, 1905);67 Adkins (Justice George Sutherland for the Court, 1923);68 
West Coast Hotel (Justice Sutherland dissenting, 1937).69  In genealogical 
order, the direct citations in this line are: West Coast Hotel 
(Sutherland)→ Adkins (Sutherland);70 Adkins (Sutherland)→ Lochner 
(Peckham);71 Lochner (Peckham)→ Allgeyer (Peckham);72 Allgeyer 
(Peckham)→ Butchers’ Union (Bradley).73  The direct citation gap in 
this genealogy that requires argument is therefore: Butchers’ Union 
(Bradley)→ Slaughter-House (Bradley). 
 
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). This case was decided 9–0.  
Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court.  Id. at 746.  Justice Bradley concurred 
separately, with Justice John Marshall Harlan and Justice William Woods concurring in this 
concurrence.  See id. at 760 (Bradley, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Field also 
separately concurred.  Id. at 754 (Field, J., concurring). 
66. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).  Allgeyer was a 9–0 decision.  Justice 
Peckham delivered the opinion of the court.  Id. at 583. 
67. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.  For Lochner’s vote break-down, see supra note 55. 
68. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 539 (1923).  For Adkins’ vote break-down, 
see supra note 57. 
69. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).  
For West Coast Hotel’s vote break-down, see supra note 59. 
70. Id. at 401 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“The principles and authorities relied upon to 
sustain the [majority’s] judgment were considered in Adkins . . . and their lack of application 
to cases like the one in hand was pointed out.  A sufficient answer to all that is now said will 
be found in [Adkins].” (citations omitted)).  Here, Justice Sutherland also specifically cited to 
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), to answer the Adkins majority.  
W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 401.  For the reasons of economy, I have not included this case in 
the Figure 2 opinion map. 
71. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545 (citing Lochner among other cases standing for the 
proposition “[t]hat the right to contract about one’s affairs is a part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by [the Due Process] clause, is settled by the decisions of this Court and 
is no longer open to question”). 
72. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) for the 
proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of 
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution”). 
73. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (“The liberty mentioned in [the Fourteenth 
Amendment] . . . is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to . . . pursue any livelihood or 
avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, 
and essential . . . .”); id. at 589–90 (quoting Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union 
for the proposition that “‘the liberty of pursuit—the right to follow any of the ordinary 
callings of life’” is a protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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A.  Justifying Implied Citation to Holmes’ Lochner Dissent 
In 1992’s Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, the Court considered whether to overrule its landmark abortion 
decision, Roe v. Wade.74  After a canonical exposition of stare decisis, the 
majority opinion concluded it was bound by its prior precedent.75  The 
opinion then examined analogies between Roe and two “national 
controversies” of “comparable dimension” where the Court had 
overruled its own precedent: 
 
The first example is that line of cases identified with Lochner, 
which imposed substantive limitations on legislation limiting 
economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation, 
adopting, in Justice Holmes’s view, the theory of laissez-faire.  
The Lochner decisions were exemplified by Adkins, in which this 
Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected 
liberty of contract to require the employers of adult women to 
satisfy minimum wage standards.  Fourteen years later, West 
Coast Hotel signaled the demise of Lochner by overruling 
Adkins.76 
 
The majority then attributed Lochner’s demise to the failure of markets 
in the Depression, which made the Court realize that “‘[t]he older world 
of laissez-faire was . . . dead’” and thus “required the new choice of 
constitutional principle.”77 
Three aspects of the Casey majority’s neat genealogical account of 
Lochner warrant our attention.78  First, consistent with the genealogy in 
Figure 1, the opinion acknowledges West Coast Hotel as the end of the 
Lochner line.  Second, the opinion specifically cites to Holmes’ Lochner 
dissent to characterize that case as embracing the theory of laissez-faire.  
Finally, the opinion explains the Court’s subsequent reversal of its own 
precedent by reference to the failure of laissez-faire.  Without directly 
 
74. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
75. Id. at 854–61. 
76. Id. at 861 (internal citations omitted). 
77. Id. at 861–62 (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 85 (1949)). 
78. The majority’s second example of a controversial case that was overruled was Plessy 
v. Fegurson.  See id. at 862–63 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and its 
repudiation by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).  The Casey majority 
rejected any analogy between Roe and Lochner or Plessy.  Id. at 861–64. 
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stating that his reasoning persuaded the West Coast Hotel majority, the 
narrative logic of the account nonetheless has Holmes playing a role in 
Lochner’s demise.  Yet we know that this story told in 1992 is 
contestable since Chief Justice Hughes’ majority opinion in West Coast 
Hotel did not cite to Holmes’ dissent or to any other authority that 
previously cited to Holmes’ dissent.79  The real question is whether the 
Justices in 1937—the year of West Coast Hotel—were affected by 
Holmes’ dissent.  Figure 1 asserts that the answer is “yes.” 
To defend this answer, we first turn to West Coast Hotel itself.  The 
case arose out of a chambermaid’s civil suit against her hotel employer 
to recover the difference between the wages paid her and the minimum 
wage fixed pursuant to Washington state’s minimum wage law for 
women.80  The Court in Adkins had previously struck down a similar 
Washington, D.C. minimum wage law for women and children.81  Of 
course, Chief Justice Hughes’s majority opinion in West Coast Hotel 
overruled Adkins.82  In so doing, Hughes explicitly cited and adopted the 
views of the two Adkins dissenters, Chief Justice Taft and Justice 
Holmes.83  This invocation of dissent as authority is itself important as it 
signals the redemption of an exiled tradition.  However, Hughes did not 
formally overrule Lochner nor did he separately invoke Holmes’ 
dissent.  The question remains whether the dissents in Adkins or the 
majority in Bunting can be linked to Holmes’ dissent. 
The first dotted arrow to consider is that from Holmes’ own dissent 
in Adkins back to his prior effort in Lochner.  First and foremost, the 
authority for connecting these two opinions derives from their common 
author.  Holmes obviously believed his own prior argument from 
 
79. Writing in dissent in Casey, Chief Justice William Rehnquist disputed the Casey 
majority’s suggestion that the Court’s realization of the bankruptcy of laissez-faire led it to 
overrule Lochner.  Id. at 960–61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  However, Rehnquist tellingly 
also included Holmes in his counter-narrative: “When the Court finally recognized its error in 
West Coast Hotel . . . it did not state that Lochner had been based on an economic view that 
had fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be overruled.  Chief Justice Hughes in his 
opinion for the Court simply recognized what Justice Holmes had previously recognized in his 
Lochner dissent, that ‘[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.’”  Id. at 961 
(alteration in original). 
80. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388 (1937). 
81. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).  The underlying disputes in 
Adkins were civil; both cases essentially involved actions against the minimum wage board to 
prevent them from enforcing orders to pay minimum wages or suffer penalties.  Id. at 542–43. 
82. See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 400 (overruling Adkins). 
83. See id. at 395–96, 396–97; Fig.1, supra p.1258; see also supra note 60. 
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Lochner when making his case in Adkins.  He also likely re-read his 
previous opinion before penning his Adkins dissent.  In both opinions, 
Holmes stressed that the state has long had the power to interfere with 
liberty of contract and gave the same two “ancient examples” of 
“Sunday laws and usury laws.”84  In both opinions, he preached 
deference to the legislature and the irrelevance of a judge’s private 
belief about the good of legislation.85  With such clear parallels, the 
formal absence of citation between Holmes’ two opinions signifies 
nothing more than modest reticence. 
The case for connecting Taft’s Adkins dissent back to Holmes’ 
Lochner dissent is also strong.  Initially, Taft plainly echoed Holmes’ 
famous line “[t]his case is decided upon an economic theory which a 
large part of the country does not entertain”86 when he wrote in Adkins 
that “it is not the function of this Court to hold congressional acts 
invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic views 
which the Court believes to be unwise or unsound.”87  Second, Taft cited 
the same precedent as Holmes had done to support his conclusion.88  
Even without this congruence of their arguments, it is almost 
inconceivable that Taft was unfamiliar with Holmes’ Lochner dissent.  
By 1923, the opinion had already found fame. 
This Article opened with reference to a 1919 Harvard Law Review 
article by Judge Hough that praised Holmes’ dissent.89  Two years later, 
in 1921, Benjamin Cardozo published his highly regarded book The 
Nature of the Judicial Process.90  In it, Cardozo wrote of a new epoch in 
constitutional thought dawning in 1883: 
 
84. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  But see 
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Usury laws prohibit contracts by which a 
man receives more than so much interest for the money that he lends. . . .  Some Sunday laws 
prohibit practically all contracts during one-seventh of our whole life.”). 
85. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I strongly believe that 
my agreement or disagreement [with a law] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to 
embody their opinions in law.”), with Adkins, 261 U.S. at 570 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The 
criterion of constitutionality is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good.”). 
86. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
87. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
88. In Lochner, Holmes had cited Holden as primary authority for permitting the 
maximum-hours law to stand as a legitimate exercise of police power.  See Lochner, 198 U.S. 
at 75; Fig.1, supra p.1258; see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.  In Adkins, Taft also 
used Holden as primary authority to support the same conclusion.  Adkins, 261 U.S. at 563 
(Taft, C.J., dissenting) (citing Holden). 
89. See Hough, supra note 1. 
90. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).  The 
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If the new epoch had then dawned, it was still obscured by fog 
and cloud. . . .  Even as late as 1905, the decision in Lochner still 
spoke in terms untouched by the light of the new spirit.  It is the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes, which men will turn to in 
the future as the beginning of an era.  In the instance, it was the 
voice of a minority.  In principle, it has become the voice of a 
new dispensation, which has written itself into law . . . .  That is 
the conception of liberty which is dominant today.  It has its 
critics even yet, but its dominance is, I think, assured.91 
 
Though Cardozo had not yet assumed his seat on the Supreme Court,92 
this passage shows that, in the eyes of serious jurists of the day, Holmes’ 
dissent represented an ascendant school of thought in Supreme Court 
discourse.  Taft—Chief Justice and former President of the United 
States—was one such serious jurist belonging to the ascendant school. 
This brings us to the case for the dotted arrow connecting Justice 
McKenna’s Bunting opinion back to Holmes’ dissent.  Decided six years 
prior to Adkins and twelve years after Lochner, Bunting upheld 
maximum-hours legislation regulating millers against a due process 
challenge raised by an employer convicted of violating the law.93  
Though this result flatly contradicted Lochner’s striking down of 
maximum-hours legislation regulating bakers, Justice McKenna’s 
opinion for the Court did not mention Lochner—majority or dissent—at 
all.94  The glaring incongruity of results between Lochner and Bunting 
 
book derived from Cardozo’s delivery of the Storrs Lectures at Yale University.  Id. 
91. Id. at 79–80 (footnotes and citation omitted).  The second set of ellipses in the block 
quote omits Cardozo’s liberal quoting of the most famous lines from Holmes’ opinion. 
92. Cardozo joined the Supreme Court in 1932 and served until 1938.  See SCOTUS 
VISUAL HISTORY, supra note 2.  Unsurprisingly, Cardozo joined the West Coast Hotel 
majority that struck down Adkins and ended Lochner’s run.  Providing neat citation for this 
proposition is tricky given the Court’s usual practice of not listing justices who joined the 
majority opinion.  However, since Cardozo was on the Court in 1937, and not among four 
West Coast Hotel dissenters, a process of elimination confirms he was in the majority.  See 
supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
93. Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 434, 438 (1917).  The case came to the Supreme 
Court on a writ of error from the Supreme Court of Oregon.  Id. at 426. 
94. See id. at 433–39.  McKenna barely cited any authority at all in his opinion, 
emphasizing instead comparative statistics that showed Oregon’s law was not unreasonable or 
arbitrary.  See id.  The narrowness of the decision appears to derive from the limited claims of 
the plaintiff-in-error.  Id. at 438.  The only relevant authority McKenna cited was Rast v. Van 
Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 365 (1916), for the proposition that the Court must defer 
to the legislature.  Id. at 437.  The Bunting dissenters did not help the situation since they 
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led Chief Justice Taft to later declare in Adkins: “It is impossible for me 
to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always 
supposed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.”95  
Taft’s sub silentio argument assumed that McKenna had read Lochner 
but deliberately ignored it.  If this is credible, it is similarly credible to 
argue that McKenna had read Holmes’ dissent but not cited it.96  This 
argument is made more plausible given the standing of Holmes’ dissent 
among jurists as described above. 
Even if this argument extending Taft’s particular sub silentio 
reasoning is unpersuasive, it should be recognized that the general 
phenomenon of sub silentio overrulings challenges the empiricists’ 
exclusive reliance on citation to measure the influence of opinions over 
doctrine.  Sometimes the Court is silent about what it is really doing.97  
In these instances, true understanding requires reading “between the 
lines” to catch the subtext.  This suggests a kind of hermeneutic reading 
that looks to surrounding context and tradition instead of only the literal 
text to grasp an opinion’s meaning.  In the case of Bunting, the 
surrounding tradition is the no-strong-right strand of economic liberty 
doctrine.  Because it is connected to this tradition, Bunting ultimately 
belongs to the same line of cases as Holmes’ Lochner dissent, which has 
been read since at least 1918 to exemplify this school of thought. 
In the end, whether Holmes’ Lochner dissent links into Figure 1’s 
genealogy from two or three opinions is unimportant.  What matters is 
the soundness of the proposition that his dissent fits in the tradition 
leading up to West Coast Hotel.  This, I submit, has been established.  
Contemporary evidence shows that scholars and jurists celebrated 
 
issued no opinion.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
95. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 564 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).  Of 
course, Adkins technically differed from Bunting and Lochner in that it concerned minimum-
wage legislation rather than maximum-hour legislation.  However, Taft rejected “the 
distinction between a minimum of wages and a maximum of hours in limiting the liberty to 
contract. . . .  In absolute freedom of contract the one term is as important as the other, for 
both enter equally into the consideration given and received, a restriction as to one is not any 
greater in essence than the other, and is of the same kind.  One is the multiplier and the other 
the multiplicand.”  Id. 
96. Taft’s assumption does seem credible given his position on the Court.  Even before 
the age of electronic databases, it seems unlikely that all of the Justices in the Bunting 
majority simply forgot or never read Lochner. 
97. For insightful recent analyses of sub silentio overrulings, see Barry Friedman, The 
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 
(2010); and Christopher J. Peters, Under-the-Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067 
(2008). 
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Holmes’ opinion well before West Coast Hotel.  Almost all modern law 
students encounter Holmes during their studies, and it seems reasonable 
to infer that his Lochner dissent entered the curriculum not long after it 
was written.  The qualities that make the dissent amenable to teaching—
its perfect brevity, trenchant analysis, and memorable aphorisms—were 
obvious from its first publication in the reporters.  The continuity of 
tradition indicates that Holmes’ Lochner dissent helped sway the 
constitutional conversation that led to Lochner’s overruling. 
The emphasis here remains on tradition.  I do not claim that 
Holmes’ dissent exerted more influence than all other opinions or the 
social facts on the ground.98  In fact, it bears emphasis that Holmes 
himself stood on the shoulders of those who came before him.  Holmes 
did not found the school supporting the state’s police power to enact 
health and welfare regulations.  Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, Holmes’ 
opinion merely marked the first time the no-strong-right school had 
appeared in dissent.  The story of Holmes’ dissent is thus intertwined 
with the story of the opinions that came before it.  It is to that earlier 
story—and the remarkable rise of economic liberty from a tradition 
initiated in an uncited dissent—that we now turn. 
B.  Justifying Implied Citation to Bradley’s Slaughter-House Dissent 
Although the constitutional conflict in Lochner flared before and 
after that case, Justice Peckham and Justice Holmes are now 
remembered as the most famous representatives of the clashing 
doctrines.  This is for good reason.  Peckham and Holmes made worthy 
adversaries.  Holmes, for one, had a gift for turning phrases.  His 
proposed due process test in Lochner has reverberated over the years: 
 
[T]he word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted 
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant 
 
98. Some commentators, for example, have suggested that Justice Harlan’s dissent 
actually exerted more influence over the course of doctrine.  See, e.g., Jason A. Adkins, Note, 
Meet Me at the (West Coast) Hotel: The Lochner Era and the Demise of Roe v. Wade, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 500, 507 (2005) (“While the majority opinion and Holmes’s dissent represent 
the polar extremes in the debate over substantive due process, it was Justice Harlan’s 
approach in Lochner that later provided the rationale for its eventual reversal in West Coast 
Hotel.”).  While there is undoubtedly merit to this position, I have chosen not to chart 
Harlan’s Lochner dissent in this map or analyze its influence over the discourse.  My modest 
goal in this Part is simply to establish that Holmes’ dissent played some role in shaping the 
debate despite its lack of citation.  Since Harlan’s dissent also went uncited, the same essential 
point could be made of his dissent. 
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opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man 
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe 
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law.99 
 
While compellingly put, Holmes’ conclusion that liberty of contract fell 
outside “the traditions of our people and our law” was certainly 
disputable at the time.100  Indeed, as Figure 2 proposes, Peckham built 
upon a tradition that stretched back at least as far as Justice Bradley’s 
dissent in Slaughter-House.101  Justice Peckham’s remarkable success in 
restoring this exiled tradition to doctrinal supremacy in Lochner—even 
if ultimately reversed—deserves recognition. 
The story of Peckham’s success is also the story of the redemption of 
Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent.  However, since the arrow to this 
Bradley’s dissent in Figure 2 is dotted, this means that connecting his 
dissent to subsequent tradition cannot be established through chains of 
citation alone.  Yet the connection is quite simple to forge and has 
indeed been recognized by previous scholars.102  The precise details and 
nature of the connection, on the other hand, are less known.103  The key 
portion of the doctrinal narrative begins with the infamous Slaughter-
House Cases and continues to its lesser known successor Butchers’ 
Union. 
Decided in 1873, the Slaughter-House Cases marked the first 
occasion the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment, 
 
99. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. 
101. See Fig.2, supra p.1273; see also supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.  
Slaughter-House marked the first time the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was interpreted by the Supreme Court.  However, the phrase “due process of 
law” originates from the Magna Carta and the traditions of interpreting the meaning of due 
process extend back much farther than 1868.  See infra notes 137–138 (citing pre-1868 sources 
that influenced the development of due process doctrine). 
102. See, e.g., McCormack, supra note 52, at 403 (“The dissents from Slaughterhouse, 
however, would later become the majority in Lochner.”) (footnote omitted); Richard A. 
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 279 (1998) (“[T]he 
decisions of the Supreme Court in the Lochner era, for example, made the nineteenth-century 
dissents of Justices Joseph Bradley and Stephen Field appear prophetic . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
103. Justice Black’s explanation of the connection remains one of the best.  See 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80–81 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  Indeed, Figure 2 
tracks his genealogy from Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House to Peckham’s majority in 
Lochner.  Black’s account, however, was skeletal and requires elaboration. 
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which passed in 1868.104  Today, the Slaughter-House majority decision 
suffers an atrocious reputation among academics and jurists.105  The 
intensity of this criticism, however, tends to obscure the underlying 
factual context and specific due process legacy of the case.  The 
underlying controversies were all civil challenges to the monopoly 
conferred by the City of New Orleans upon the Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company.106  The challenged 
Louisiana legislation responded to genuine public health concerns over 
outbreaks of yellow fever and cholera by confining all abattoir 
operations in New Orleans to a defined subsection of the city.107  The law 
also conferred a monopoly to one company to run the city abattoir, but 
permitted any butcher to slaughter meat under the company’s aegis 
upon payment of a fee.108  Justice Samuel Miller’s majority opinion 
upheld the scheme as a valid exercise of police power.109  The enduring 
controversy over Slaughter-House centers not on this rather reasonable 
result, but rather over its doctrinal justification.  The main problem 
pointed out by the dissenters in Slaughter-House and by modern 
commentators is that it effectively obliterated the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.110 
While the overwhelming bulk of debate in the case turns on the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is vital to recall that the Court also 
 
104. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70–71 (1873) (discussing context for 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Slaughter-House also involved interpretation of 
the Thirteenth Amendment outlawing slavery.  See id. at 68–69. 
105. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3029–30 (2010) 
(collecting sharp and broad-ranging criticism of Slaughter-House). 
106. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57. 
107. See id. at 59; see also Jonathan Lurie, Reflections on Justice Samuel F. Miller and the 
Slaughter-House Cases: Still a Meaty Subject, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 355, 356 & n.10 (2005) 
(describing health epidemics that led to passage of legislation). 
108. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59–60.  
109. See id. at 62–63 (discussing relationship between police power and public health 
implications of slaughtering animals). 
110. The Court interpreted Privileges and Immunities to protect only exclusively federal 
rights from state intrusion and defined exclusively federal rights very narrowly.  See id. at 96 
(Field, J., dissenting) (“If this inhibition . . . only refers, as held by the majority of the court in 
their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially 
designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United 
States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily 
excited Congress and the people on its passage.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and 
Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631 n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious 
modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that this [interpretation] is a plausible reading 
of the Amendment.”) (quoted in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030). 
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considered whether the monopoly conferred on one company deprived 
competing butchers of their liberty or property without due process of 
law.111  The majority quickly dismissed the argument, stating that “under 
no construction [of the Due Process Clause] that we have ever seen, or 
any that we deem admissible” could the monopoly be deemed a 
deprivation.112  In his dissent, however, Justice Bradley developed a due 
process argument based on an economic conception of “liberty.”113  
After invoking the Magna Carta and “traditionary rights and privileges” 
Americans inherited from their ancestors,114 Bradley concluded: 
 
In my view, a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from 
adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful 
employment previously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as 
well as property, without due process of law.  Their right of 
choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is their 
property.115 
 
These words provided the textual roots for Lochnerism.  However, no 
opinion in the strong economic-due-process school ever directly quoted 
these words or cited Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent.  Rather, 
Bradley’s concept of liberty passed to the next generation through his 
subsequent concurrence in Butchers’ Union, which I assert is connected 
hermeneutically to his Slaughter-House dissent. 
Decided in 1884, Butchers’ Union basically cast the same characters 
from Slaughter-House in reversed roles.116  Six years after Slaughter-
House, the state of Louisiana adopted a new constitution which 
abolished its previously conferred abattoir monopoly.117  The previous 
monopoly holders sued, but the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the 
 
111. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66 (reciting counsel’s argument 
that the law deprived the butchers of property without due process of law). 
112. Id. at 81. 
113. See id. at 114–16 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“This right to choose one’s calling is an 
essential part of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, 
when chosen, is a man’s property and right.”). 
114. Id. at 114–15 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 122 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
116. See Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City 
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746, 746 (1884). 
117. Id. at 748. 
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state’s right to take away what it had previously granted.118  Justice 
Bradley wrote separately to repeat his view that the old monopoly had 
never been valid because, inter alia, the law had deprived butchers of 
their liberty to pursue a calling and occupation.119  Since he wrote in 
concurrence, Bradley’s Butchers’ Union opinion is represented in Figure 
2 as lying precisely on the line that separates majority from dissent.120 
The justification for the hermeneutic link between Bradley’s two 
opinions thus derives from the common identity between author, 
litigants, subject-matter, and doctrinal themes.  This connection seems 
hard to deny.  As Justice Hugo Black later recognized, Bradley’s due 
process analysis in Butchers’ Union “closely followed one phase of the 
argument of his dissent in the original Slaughter-House cases.”121  
Unfortunately, a pure citation-counting heuristic would not capture this 
connection between Bradley’s Slaughter-House dissent and the rest of 
the economic due process doctrine.122  The hermeneutic method does not 
suffer from this limitation.  And with the connection to Butchers’ Union 
established, we can now complete the story of Justice Peckham’s victory 
and redemption of Bradley’s dissent. 
After Butchers’ Union comes Allgeyer.  Decided in 1897, the 
underlying case in Allgeyer concerned a civil fine issued against a 
company for violating a Louisiana law prohibiting individuals within the 
state from making contracts of insurance with corporations doing 
business in New York.123  Writing for a unanimous majority, Peckham 
struck down the statute as violating the right of contract guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause.124  He accomplished this impressive feat by 
making two key moves that consolidated a due process tradition that 
had previously existed in exile.  First, he directly quoted Justice 
 
118. Id. at 754. 
119. Id. at 765 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
120. I see this position as fairly tracking the precedential value of a concurrence relative 
to a majority or dissenting opinion.  It lies somewhere in between in a way difficult to define. 
121. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 80–81 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  The phase 
of the argument Black refers to, of course, is the due process analysis. 
122. Close analysis of the text of Butchers’ Union reveals that Bradley refers to his 
Slaughter-House dissent without actually citing it.  See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764 
(Bradley, J., concurring).  After citing the Slaughter-House majority, Bradley states, “I then 
held, and still hold . . . .”  Id.  This oblique reference demonstrates the importance of context 
to understanding the relationship between a text and its surrounding tradition.  A naked 
citation-counting scheme could not account for this subtlety. 
123. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1897). 
124. Id. at 592–93. 
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Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union.125  Here Peckham 
explicitly extended remarks Bradley made in the monopoly context to 
“describe the rights which are covered by the word ‘liberty’ as contained 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.”126  Second, Peckham seized upon dicta 
from a case called Powell v. Pennsylvania, in which the Court stated that 
“‘the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling . . . is an essential part of 
[the] rights of liberty and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.’”127  Though neither Bradley’s concurrence nor Powell’s 
dicta individually had the force of precedent, Peckham ingeniously 
combined the two authorities and established liberty of contract as 
Supreme Court doctrine in Allgeyer. 
When Lochner came before the Court, Peckham simply grounded 
his majority opinion in the authority of his own words in Allgeyer, citing 
it for the proposition that “[t]he general right [of an employer] to make 
a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty . . . protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”128  Here 
Peckham distilled his longer argument from Allgeyer into a concrete 
proposition that marked the ascendancy of the strong-right-to-
economic-liberty school.  Though the school did not forever grasp the 
reins of power, the dexterity of Peckham’s argumentation certainly 
made a mark.  In his Lochner dissent, Holmes patently ignored Allgeyer.  
Although Peckham likely delighted at this omission, the shortcoming in 
Holmes’ legal argument mattered more in 1905 than it does today.129 
 
125. Id. at 589–90 (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762, 764, 765 (1884) (Bradley, J., 
concurring)). 
126. Id.  
127. Id. at 590 (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888)).  Powell was an 
8–1 decision.  Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Court and Justice Stephen Field 
dissented.  The case involved an appeal from a criminal conviction for selling oleomargarine 
butter in violation of law a prohibiting non-dairy butter substitutes.  See Powell, 127 U.S. at 
685.  The majority upheld the conviction, a result consistent with the no-strong-right school of 
economic due process.  Thus, although Peckham in Allgeyer quoted language from Justice 
Harlan’s majority opinion, his analysis was far more in line with Justice Stephen Field’s 
Powell dissent.  Compare id. at 683–87, with id. at 691–92 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
liberty under the Due Process Clause means freedom “to follow such pursuits as may be best 
adapted to [a person’s] facilities”).  The complexity of Peckham’s direct cite to the majority of 
a rival school and implied cite to the dissent of an ally explains why Powell does not appear in 
Figure 2.  Though intriguing, representing the crossed connections would unhelpfully obscure 
the essential picture of the strong-right school. 
128. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589). 
129. This is not to say that precedent mattered more in 1905 legal arguments than they 
do today.  My point is rather that the subsequent redemption of Holmes’ opinion makes the 
gaps in his authority seem less important to the modern legal reader.  After all, Holmes has 
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Figure 3130 depicts both strands of SDP economic liberty doctrine.  
As can be seen, the separate lines cross twice.  These crossings represent 
junctures where one doctrinal school moved from exile in dissent into 
the majority.  Here, the strong economic liberty strand moved from 
dissent in Slaughterhouse to majority in Allgeyer.  The contra strand 
subsequently moved from dissent in Lochner to majority in West Coast 
Hotel.  Right in the middle of the movement sits the one case not yet 
discussed—Holden.  Holmes cited Holden in his Lochner dissent as a 
recent example of a decision “cutting down the liberty to contract.”131  
Decided in 1898, a year after Allgeyer, Justice Henry Brown’s majority 
opinion in Holden reveals the contemporary doctrinal uncertainty in 
conflicts between police power and the economic rights of individuals.132  
Brown candidly acknowledged both that Allgeyer upheld a right of 
contract133 and that “many authorities . . . hold that state statues 
restricting the hours of labor are unconstitutional.”134  In the end, 
however, Justice Brown categorized a law imposing an eight-hour 
maximum workday for miners as falling on the “valid exercise of the 
police power” side of the debate.135  This result was consistent with 
Slaughterhouse, a case Brown invoked as first establishing the inability 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit “a proper police regulation 
for the health and comfort of the people.”136  
Justice Brown’s evident difficulty in Holden in reconciling conflicting 
cases hints at the dialectical role played by competing schools of due 
process thought in shaping due process doctrine.  Opinions are 
arguments and they often respond to arguments made in other opinions.  
Sometimes the argument is between majority and dissent in the same 
 
become an authority in his own right.  His then-unsupported assertions about the 
constitution’s meaning now command more respect than Allgeyer. 
130. See infra App., at p.1327. 
131. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 
366 (1898), as one such example). 
132. Holden, 169 U.S. at 380.  The underlying action was a habeas action challenging the 
criminal prosecution initiated against Holden for employing a miner in violation of the eight-
hour maximum day law.  Id. at 366–67. 
133. Id. at 391 (discussing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591, but concluding that “[t]his right of 
contract, however, is itself subject to certain limitations which the State may lawfully impose 
in the exercise of its police powers”). 
134. Id. at 397–98. 
135. Id. at 398 (“We are of the opinion that the act in question was a valid exercise of the 
police power of the State . . . .”). 
136. Id. at 382 (discussing Slaughter-House). 
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case.  Sometimes the argument pits majority from one school against 
subsequent majority from the competing school.  Doctrine ultimately 
emerges from this argument dialectic.  Dividing doctrine into competing 
schools helps picture this dialectic but inevitably oversimplifies the 
underlying complexity. 
It thus bears repeating that the opinion maps presented here do not 
purport to depict the whole of economic due process doctrine.  A vast 
universe of texts has affected economic due process doctrine—this 
universe includes the Magna Carta,137 English opinions from before the 
Revolutionary War,138 state-court opinions,139 advocates’ briefs,140 and 
even non-pictured Supreme Court opinions.141  And yet, the absence of 
these other texts from Figures 1–3 does not detract from the central 
claim that uncited dissents played a vital role in shaping economic due 
process doctrine.  Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House and Holmes’ 
dissent in Lochner articulated the teachings of their rival schools.  Even 
though neither opinion was cited within the majority opinions that 
formally changed the law, these dissents sustained the traditions that 
made formal change possible.  The real use of Figures 1–3 is to put these 
dissents on the maps, record their places in the genealogies, and draw 
 
137. See, e.g., id. at 387–89 (analyzing the discussion of Magna Charta in Hurtado v. 
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 114–15 (1873) 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (describing Magna Charta as source of “fundamental rights” 
protected by due process of law). 
138. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 101–04 (Field, J., dissenting) 
(dissecting the Case of Monopolies, decided in reign of Queen Elizabeth and reported by 
Coke). 
139. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905) (collecting state cases 
where “courts upheld the right of free contract and the right to purchase and sell labor upon 
such terms as the parties may agree to”). 
140. In a wonderful article published in 1938, Walton Hamilton compellingly argued that 
former Supreme Court justice John Archibald Campbell single-handedly blazed the path for 
economic due process when he represented the butchers of New Orleans challenging the 
monopoly in Slaughter-House.  See Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48 
ETHICS 269, 273–83 (1938).  Advocating before the Court where he used to sit, Campbell did 
not win Slaughter-House, but as Hamilton points out “the loss of a cause is not the loss of a 
doctrine.”  Id. at 280.  “[A]ll the justices who spoke for the court or in dissent [in Slaughter-
House] addressed themselves to Mr. Campbell’s argument,” id. at 279, and fourteen years 
later, the Court followed the path “Mr. Campbell had blazed . . . for a novel doctrine.”  Id. at 
283 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
141. See, e.g., supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Powell v. 
Pennsylvania); supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Harlan’s dissent 
in Lochner). 
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them into the constellations.  Whatever the metaphor, non-cited dissents 
forever changed economic due process doctrine. 
IV.  DUE PROCESS AND INCORPORATION 
Substantive due process doctrine is an expansive family tree with 
many branches.  Though the direct economic liberty line has largely died 
out, other branches of the SDP genealogy have survived and 
reproduced.  Living and generally well-liked relatives to economic 
liberty include SDP protections for the rights of individuals to marry 
those of different races,142 the rights of parents to direct the upbringing 
and education of their children,143 and the rights of individuals to use 
contraception.144  More controversial cousins include the right of women 
to obtain an abortion145 and the right of same-sex couples to engage in 
consensual sex.146  One lesser-known clan in the SDP genealogy is that 
family of cases that “incorporate”—to use the term of art147—rights in 
the Bill of Rights into the substantive protections of the Due Process 
Clause and apply them against the States.  This Part examines the 
 
142. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing a due-process as well as 
an equal protection-based right to marry a person of another race). 
143. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (vindicating right of 
parents to direct education of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–403 
(1923) (striking down prohibition on teaching foreign languages).  The specific connection 
between these cases and the Court’s Lochner jurisprudence is explored in Bernstein, supra 
note 49, at 301–02. 
144. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to use 
contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (right of married couples to 
use contraception). 
145. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).  It is noteworthy that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
in Lawrence specifically cited and redeemed Justice John Paul Stevens’ dissent in Bowers.  
See id. at 578 (“Justice Stevens’ analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers 
and should control here.”).  Though I do not undertake to examine the role of dissents in 
shaping this area of SDP doctrine, the case clearly could be made. 
147. Use of “incorporation” to refer to the mechanism of applying an Amendment from 
the Bill of Rights against the states through the Due Process Clause emerged in the early 
1940s.  See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 (1942) (“The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the 
Sixth Amendment . . . .”).  By the time Charles Fairman published his influential law review 
article on the topic in 1949, “incorporation” was a bona fide term of art.  See Charles 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original 
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) (arguing against incorporation). 
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development of incorporation doctrine and shows how dissents shaped 
its competing lines of tradition. 
Although incorporation doctrine unquestionably belongs in the SDP 
line,148 it also possesses a peculiar trait that marks it as an 
unconventional relative.  The distinguishing feature of incorporation 
doctrine is its direct connection to constitutional text.  Mainline SDP 
rights such as those concerning the upbringing of children or sexual 
privacy find no specific mention in the Constitution, but derive rather 
from reading the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of “liberty” to protect 
practices “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and 
women].”149  On the other hand, those rights “incorporated” against the 
States through the Due Process Clause necessarily appear directly 
somewhere in the Bill of Rights.  The apparent contradiction here is 
explained by the fact that it has been settled since 1833’s Barron ex rel. 
Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore that that the array of liberties secured by 
the Bill of Rights applied only against the Federal Government.150  
Incorporation thus refers to the practice of reading the Due Process 
Clause’s guarantee of “liberty” to protect against State infringement 
certain practices protected against Federal infringement by the Bill of 
Rights.151 
Three decades after Barron, the wisdom of exempting the States 
from honoring federal rights became an issue again after the bloody 
Civil War and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  At first 
blush, the best textual mechanism for applying the Bill of Rights against 
the States seemed to be the new amendment’s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, which provided that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
 
148. Incorporation’s status as a substantive due process doctrine was accepted by both 
sides of the most recent debate.  Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 
3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as 
an original matter, I have acquiesced in the Court’s incorporation of certain guarantees in the 
Bill of Rights.”), with id. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“This is a substantive due process 
case.”).  The McDonald case is explored at length infra. 
149. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).  There are, of course, many other 
ways to formulate the substantive due process test.  For an interesting (though disapproving) 
“collection of the catchwords and catch phrases” in this area, see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511–
12 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting). 
150. See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
151. Incorporation also protects rights to the “life” or “property” guaranteed in the Bill 
of Rights. 
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States.”152  However, as discussed in the previous Part, the Slaughter-
House majority promptly killed the Clause as a mechanism for enforcing 
all but the narrowest set of exclusively national rights against the 
States.153  This doctrinal setback did not vanquish the school seeking to 
apply the Bill of Rights against the States.  Rather, it changed the 
textual strategy.  Focus soon shifted to the Due Process Clause just one 
semi-colon to the right of Privileges or Immunities.154 
This strategy initially failed.  In 1884’s Hurtado v. California, an 
eight Justice majority led by Justice Stanley Matthews rejected the idea 
that the Due Process Clause incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s 
requirement of indictment by Grand Jury in a capital case.155  However, 
Matthews’ opinion conceded that the Clause protected “the very 
substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property” and not just 
“particular forms of procedure.”156  And writing in dissent, Justice John 
Marshall Harlan made a compelling case for finding that Due Process 
Clause should protect those “fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice” described in the Bill of Rights.157  From these initial divergences 
of opinion were born the competing schools of incorporation doctrine. 
The subsequent debate extended over a century and as of today, 
almost all of the rights in Bill of Rights apply against the States.158  
Recently, the Court incorporated the Second Amendment in the 
McDonald case.159  The story of this remarkable turn-around of the pro-
incorporation school is largely the story of two redeemed dissents—first 
of Justice Harlan’s Hurtado dissent and then of Justice Hugo Black’s 
epic dissent in Adamson v. California.160  Though these dissents provided 
the intellectual ammunition for the cases that redeemed them—Powell 
v. Alabama161 and Gideon v. Wainwright162 respectively—neither dissent 
 
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
153. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
155. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884). 
156. See id. at 532.  This statement may constitute the earliest reference to the 
substantive component of due process in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
157. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
158. For a complete survey of all the rights that have and have not been incorporated, 
see McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034–35 nn.12–14 (2010). 
159. Id. 
160. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
161. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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was directly cited therein.  Proving the hermeneutic connection of these 
dissents to the tradition embraced in Powell and Gideon is the primary 
task of subparts A and B below. 
Subpart C examines the genealogy of the school generally opposing 
incorporation.  This school largely, but not entirely, dominated the 
doctrine from Hurtado until the criminal procedure revolution of the 
Warren Court in the 1960s.163  When it fell into dissent, the anti-
incorporation school found a new champion in the second Justice John 
Marshall Harlan (grandson of the first).  In his remarkable final dissent 
on the Court after a thirty-five year career, Justice Stevens ostensibly 
embraced Harlan’s dissents in McDonald.164  At first blush, Stevens’ 
embrace seems strange because this anti-incorporation tradition 
explicitly rejected expansion of criminal procedure rights that Stevens 
himself undoubtedly welcomed.  However, a hermeneutic analysis helps 
resolve this tension.  I argue that Stevens’ dissent should not be read 
literally as a defense of the anti-incorporation school but should be 
understood instead as a stirring final lecture for future generations on 
the proper meaning of substantive due process doctrine writ large. 
  
 
162. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
163. Given the centrality of criminal procedure cases to the incorporation debate of the 
1960s, I have chosen to focus on criminal procedure opinions in my incorporation 
genealogies.  This means omitting opinions from the 1920s–1940s that applied First 
Amendment rights against the states.  See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 
(free exercise); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. 
Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925) (free speech and press).  Though relevant, the secondary importance of these 
cases to the story of modern incorporation’s rise does not justify their inclusion in opinion 
maps designed to usefully simplify the picture of doctrine. 
164. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Though the map of incorporation doctrine presented in Figure 4 
above is complex, the same principles of interpretation apply as in 
simpler economic liberty maps.  Beyond the direct claims of citation, 
Figure 4 suggests two main arguments: (1) that Justice Black’s dissents 
in Adamson and Betts were redeemed by, but not cited in Gideon; and 
(2) that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado was redeemed by, but not 
cited in Powell v. Alabama.  After presenting the raw genealogical data 
for this Figure, I will first consider last Term’s McDonald case to 
describe the current understanding of incorporation doctrine, and then 
turn to a defense of these two arguments. 
Figure 4 depicts the lines connecting opinions in the doctrinal school 
generally favoring incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States.  
In chronological order, the opinions in the school are: Harlan in 
Hurtado v. California (Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissenting, 1884);165 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (Justice 
Harlan for the Court, 1897);166 Maxwell v. Dow (Justice Harlan, 
dissenting, 1900);167 Twining v. New Jersey (Justice Harlan, dissenting, 
1908);168 Powell v. Alabama (Justice George Sutherland for the Court, 
1932);169 Betts v. Brady (Justice Hugo Black dissenting, 1942);170 
Adamson v. California (Justice Black dissenting, 1947);171 Gideon v. 
 
165. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Hurtado 
was an 8–1 decision.  Justice Stanley Matthews wrote the majority opinion.  Id. at 519. 
166. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).  
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy was a 7–1 decision.  Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the 
Court.  Id. at 228.  Chief Justice Melville Fuller took no part in the case.  Id. at 263.  Justice 
David Brewer wrote a solo dissent.  Id. at 258. 
167. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Maxwell was an 
8–1 decision.  Justice Rufus Peckham delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 582. 
168. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Twining 
was an 8–1 decision.  Justice William Moody delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 90. 
169. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65–68 (1932).  Powell was a 7–2 decision.  Justice 
George Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 49.  Justice Pierce Butler 
dissented and Justice James McReynolds joined.  Id. at 73, 77 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
170. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 465, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).  Betts was a 6–3 
decision.  Justice Owen Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 456.  Justice Black 
dissented with Justices William Douglas and Frank Murphy joining the dissent.  Id. at 474 
(Black, J, dissenting). 
171. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  Adamson was 
a 5–4 decision.  Justice Stanley Reed delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 47.  Justice 
Felix Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion.  Id. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
Justice Frank Murphy wrote a dissent and Justice Wiley Rutledge joined.  Id. at 123 (Murphy, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Black wrote a separate dissenting opinion and Justice William Douglas 
joined in it.  Id. at 68, 92 (Black, J., dissenting).  Because only Douglas joined Black’s dissent, 
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Wainwright (Justice Black for the Court, 1963);172 Malloy v. Hogan 
(Justice William Brennan for the Court, 1964);173 Duncan v. Louisiana 
(Justice Byron White for the Court, 1968);174 and McDonald v. City of 
Chicago (Justice Samuel Alito for the plurality, 2010).175  In genealogical 
order, the direct citations in this line are: McDonald (Alito)→ Duncan 
(White);176 Duncan (White)→ Malloy (Brennan);177 Malloy (Brennan)→ 
Gideon (Black);178 Gideon (Black)→ Powell v. Alabama (Sutherland);179 
 
I record it as receiving two votes. 
172. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).  Gideon was a 9–0 decision.  
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 336.  Justice Douglas wrote a separate 
concurring opinion.  Id. at 345 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Justice Tom Clark concurred in 
result and wrote a separate opinion.  Id. at 347 (Clark, J., concurring in result).  Justice John 
Marshall Harlan (II) concurred and wrote a separate opinion.  Id. at 349.  (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  I record Black’s opinion for the Court as receiving only eight votes in terms of 
incorporation because of Justice Harlan’s clear opposition to this point.  See id. at 352 
(Harlan, J, concurring) (“In what is done today I do not understand the Court . . . to embrace 
the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment ‘incorporates’ the Sixth Amendment as such.”).  
Given Clark’s vote in Malloy, see infra note 173, it is arguable that the actual incorporation 
vote was seven.  However, Clark’s Gideon opinion is equivocal enough on incorporation, see 
id. at 348 (Clark, J., concurring in result), that I give Black the benefit of his vote. 
173. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).  Malloy was a 5–4 opinion.  Justice William 
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id.  Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the 
Court but also expressed his adherence to his concurrence in Gideon.  Id. at 14 (Douglas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark dissented.  Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Justice Byron White, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, separately dissented.  Id. at 33 (White, 
J., dissenting). 
174. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).  Duncan was a 7–2 decision.  Justice 
White delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id.  Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Potter 
Stewart, dissented.  Id. at 171 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
175. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
McDonald was a 5–4 decision. Justice Alito wrote the plurality opinion for Part II-C, which 
concerned incorporation.  Id. at 3026 (Part II-C was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy).  Justice Scalia wrote a separate 
concurrence.  Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote a 
separate concurrence in which he rejected the plurality’s incorporation theory.  Id. at 3058 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice John Paul Stevens 
wrote a solo dissent.  Id. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a 
separate dissent and was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor.  Id. 
at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Because only a plurality voted for incorporation, I categorize 
it as falling exactly on the line between majority and dissent.  See Fig.4, supra p.1292. 
176. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034–36 (repeatedly citing and quoting Duncan). 
177. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 (generally citing Malloy); id. at 155 (citing Malloy to 
justify overruling “prior dicta” regarding application of Sixth Amendment). 
178. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6 (citing Gideon). 
179. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45 (1932)). 
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Adamson (Black)→ Twining (Harlan);180 Betts (Black)→ Twining 
(Harlan);181 Powell v. Alabama (Sutherland)→ Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy (Harlan);182 Maxwell (Harlan)→ Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
(Harlan);183 Maxwell (Harlan)→ Hurtado (Harlan).184 
Analysis of Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality decision in McDonald 
reveals the current self-understanding of the tradition affirming 
incorporation.  McDonald concerned the reach of the Court’s 2008 
District of Columbia v. Heller decision, which held that a District of 
Columbia law banning possession of handguns violated the Second 
Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms.185  McDonald presented the 
question of whether the federal Second Amendment right recognized in 
Heller applied against the States.186  The McDonald petitioners advanced 
two distinct arguments in favor of incorporation.  Quite boldly, their 
primary gambit invited the Court to overrule Slaughter-House and find 
that the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is one of the 
“‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States’” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.187  Petitioners’ fallback argument advocated 
that the Court incorporate the Second Amendment through the Due 
Process Clause.188  In the end, a five justice majority sided with 
petitioners.189  However, in a passionate concurrence, Justice Clarence 
Thomas explicitly rejected incorporation through the Due Process 
Clause and endorsed overruling Slaughter-House.190  As a result, Alito’s 
opinion favoring incorporation represented only a four-vote plurality.191 
 
180. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 87 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing “the 
powerful argument . . . of Mr. Justice Harlan” in his Twining dissent). 
181. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474–75 n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing 
Harlan’s dissent in Twining).  Note that here Black does not single out Harlan by name 
though he does cite three of Harlan’s dissents. 
182. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932) (citing and discussing Chi., Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). 
183. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 614 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Chi., 
Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 233, 241). 
184. Id. at 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recalling his Hurtado dissent and adhering to 
views expressed therein). 
185. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  Like McDonald, Heller 
was a 5–4 decision. 
186. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). 
187. See id. at 3028 (quoting petitioners). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 3026. 
190. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree that [the Second Amendment] 
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Justice Alito’s opinion presents an account of the genealogy of the 
pro-incorporation school.  Justice Alito divided the history of the 
Court’s incorporation jurisprudence into two distinct eras.  In Alito’s 
genealogy, the Court first considered “whether the Due Process Clause 
prohibits the States from infringing rights set out in the Bill of Rights” in 
the late 19th century.192  This early era had three distinctive features:193 
(1) the Court sometimes evaluated whether protection was required of a 
State by asking “if a civilized system could be imagined that would not 
accord the particular protection”;194 (2) the Court frequently held “that a 
right set out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test for inclusion 
within the protection of the Due Process Clause”;195 and (3) even when 
the Court found a right from the Bill of Rights fell within due process, 
the protection provided against State infringement “sometimes differed 
from the protection . . . provided against abridgement by the Federal 
Government.”196  On Alito’s telling, these three distinctive early features 
all changed in the modern era. 
Before describing this modern era, Alito considered the “alternative 
theory regarding the relationship between the Bill of Rights and § 1 of 
 
is enforceable against the States through a clause that speak only to ‘process.’  Instead, the 
right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”); see also id. at 3086 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting Slaughter-House “insofar as it precludes any overlap 
between the privileges and immunities of state and federal citizenship”). 
191. See id. at 3026 (Part II-C was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin 
Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy). 
192. Id. at 3031 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 516 (1884); Chi., Burlington 
& Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).  Note that these first two cases 
match up precisely with the genealogy suggested in Figure 4. 
193. Alito noted five total features of the era.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3031–32.  
However, the first three of these features did change in subsequent eras and thus were not 
distinctive.  See id. at 3034 (noting that decisions of modern era “abandoned three of the 
previously noted characteristics of the earlier period”).  On Alito’s account, the non-changing 
features were that: (1) the Court viewed the due process question as “entirely separate” from 
the privilege or immunity question, id. at 3031 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 
(1908)); and (2) the Court protected only those rights “included in the conception of due 
process” and “used different formulations in describing the boundaries of due process.”  Id. at 
3031–32 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
194. Id. at 3032 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Note that here Alito is quoting a modern case’s summary of the earlier 
era in question.  It is precisely because Alito is picking up interpretative thread of Duncan 
that Figure 4 depicts Duncan as McDonald’s immediate ancestor. 
195. Id. (collecting examples). 
196. Id. (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942); and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25 (1949)). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment . . . championed by Justice Black.”197  Alito 
accurately portrays Black as supporting the theory of “total 
incorporation”—which held that § 1 made all of the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the States, effectively overruling Tiernan.198  Although 
Alito points out that “the Court never has embraced Justice Black’s 
‘total incorporation theory,’” he also tellingly observes that “the Court 
eventually moved in that direction by initiating what has been called a 
process of ‘selective incorporation.’”199  Critically for our purposes, 
Alito’s observation directly acknowledges the role of Black’s dissents in 
shaping the change in incorporation doctrine between its early and 
modern eras. 
Before separately analyzing the impact of Black’s dissents, we need 
to complete our account of Alito’s genealogy.  After acknowledging 
Black, Alito turned to the modern era of “selective incorporation,” 
where the Court held that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates 
particular rights contained in the first eight Amendments.200  Selective 
incorporation, per Alito, rejected the three distinctive features of the 
early era.  First, the Court “made it clear that the governing standard is 
not whether any ‘civilized system [can] be imagined’” without a 
particular Bill of Rights guarantee, but rather whether the right “is 
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”201  
Second, the Court abandoned its earlier distinctive habit of finding that 
a right set out in the Bill of Rights failed to meet the test of inclusion 
and “eventually incorporated almost all of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.”202  Finally, selective incorporation also “decisively held that 
incorporated Bill of Rights protections ‘are all to be enforced against 
 
197. Id. at 3032–33. 
198. Id. at 3033 (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting)).  In consecutive footnotes, Justice Alito summarizes the evidence for and against 
Black’s total incorporation theory.  See id. at 3033 nn.9–10.  In the end, however, Alito 
“take[s] no position with respect to this academic debate.”  Id. at 3033 n.10.  Following the 
good Justice’s wise lead, neither will I venture into such perilous waters. 
199. Id. at 3033–34 (collecting cases). 
200. Id. at 3034. 
201. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 n.14 (1968)) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
202. Id. at 3034.  In two useful footnotes, Alito describes all the rights that have been 
incorporated, id. at 3034 n.12, as well as those few Bill of Rights protections that remain 
unincorporated.  Id. at 3035 n.13. 
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the States . . . according to the same standards that protect those 
personal rights against federal encroachment.’”203 
The touchstone case in Alito’s genealogy is Duncan.  Duncan 
provides for Alito the ultimate standard for incorporation—whether a 
Bill of Right protection “is fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty.”204  In Alito’s view, this standard is synonymous with an inquiry 
into whether a Bill of Right is “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.’”205  Of course, Justice Alito subsequently concluded that 
the right to keep and bear arms was deeply rooted in the Nation’s 
history and tradition.206  The Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms, as interpreted by Heller, was therefore incorporated against the 
States.207  The particulars of the heated contest over competing traditions 
of firearm ownership and regulation need not detain us.208  Rather, what 
is important to recognize is that Alito’s account of incorporation 
doctrine writ large itself grows out of a particular tradition—last 
articulated by Justice Byron White in Duncan. 
Figure 4 therefore draws an arrow back from Alito’s opinion in 
McDonald to White’s opinion in Duncan.209  Duncan, in turn, explicitly 
relied upon and extended the selective incorporation approach of 
Malloy.210  Justice William Brennan, generally considered the primary 
 
203. Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).  In a footnote, Justice 
Alito recognized “one exception to this general rule” that “incorporated Bill of Rights 
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government”—the Sixth 
Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, but not in state 
criminal trials.  See id. at 3035 n.14 (discussing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)).  Alito characterizes this as an anomaly 
attributable to “an unusual division among the Justices.”  Id. 
204. Id. at 3036 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149). 
205. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
206. See id. at 3036 (“Heller makes it clear that this [Second Amendment] right is 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721)). 
207. Id. at 3050 (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”). 
208. Justice Breyer highlighted the continuing academic debate over the historical right 
to keep and bear arms in his dissent.  See id. at 3121 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (collecting law 
review articles and citing an amici brief filed by historians).  Justice Alito quickly dismissed 
these arguments.  Id. at 3048 (“[W]hile there is certainly room for disagreement about 
Heller’s analysis of the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller 
persuades us to reopen the question there decided.”). 
209. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
210. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 177.  The specific proposition that Duncan 
represented a victory for selective incorporation (as opposed to total incorporation) was 
directly conceded by Justice Black.  See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Black, 
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architect of selective incorporation, wrote the majority opinion in 
Malloy.211  In Malloy, Brennan cited back to Gideon as the most recent 
example of the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence.212  It is important to 
notice that the arrows connecting McDonald to Gideon only link 
opinions accepted by a majority of the Court.  The modern 
incorporation doctrine described by Alito in McDonald was put on the 
doctrinal map by Gideon.213  After Gideon, the Court handed down an 
incredible series of cases overruling established precedent that had 
denied state criminal defendants the same protections granted their 
federal counterparts.214  These overrulings helped define the Warren 
Court revolution in criminal procedure.  Gideon thus represents a 
critical turning point in modern incorporation doctrine. 
Though Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in Gideon, he did 
not cite to his earlier dissents where he introduced his incorporation 
theory.  One proposition asserted in Figure 4 is that Black’s Gideon 
opinion nonetheless redeemed his prior dissents in Betts and then 
Adamson.  To prove this, consider first that Betts concerned an indigent 
defendant facing robbery charges who had requested the appointment 
 
J., concurring) (“I am very happy to support this selective process through which our Court 
has since the Adamson case held most of the specific Bill of Rights’ protections applicable to 
the States to the same extent they are applicable to the Federal Government.”). 
211. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; see also supra note 173; Louis Henkin, “Selective 
Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 74 n.1 (1963) (describing 
selective incorporation as “the Brennan doctrine”). 
212. See Fig.4, supra p.1292; supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
213. It could be argued that Mapp v. Ohio, a case that preceded Gideon by almost two 
years actually represented the first salvo in the incorporation revolution of the 1960s.  See 367 
U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).  After all, Justice Brennan 
relied heavily on Mapp in Malloy.  See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (analyzing 
Mapp).  However, the role of incorporation theory in Mapp is unclear.  Certainly, Justice 
Clark did not allude to a theory of incorporation in his majority opinion, which applied the 
federal exclusionary rule to the states.  By contrast, incorporation was front and center in 
Gideon both because of Black’s fame as a proponent of that view and because of Douglas’ 
concurrence.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345–47 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
What’s more, Clark later clearly sided with Harlan in the campaign against incorporation.  
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.  Thus, despite Brennan’s reading of Mapp in 
Malloy, I submit that Mapp did not establish the arrival of incorporation in the majority 
nearly as clearly as did Gideon. 
214. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (overruling Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154 (abrogating Maxwell v. Dow, 176 
U.S. 581 (1900); and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)); Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6 
(1964) (overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); and Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46 (1947)).  Justice Black sided with the majority in all these cases. 
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of counsel.215  After denial of this request, defendant was convicted and 
subsequently brought a federal habeas action.216  In the Betts majority 
opinion, Justice Owen Roberts held that while the Sixth Amendment 
required appointment of counsel to indigents in federal court,217 “the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as 
such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment.”218  Justice 
Black dissented in Betts, briefly alluding to his concept of incorporation: 
“I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to 
the states.  But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never 
been accepted by a majority of this Court . . . .”219  Black urged that the 
“fundamental” due process right to counsel in capital cases recognized 
in Powell v. Alabama should extend to all proceedings involving poor 
people facing “charges of serious crime[s].”220 
One the most important criminal procedure cases in Supreme Court 
history, Gideon expressly overruled Betts.221  Now writing for the 
majority, Black held that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”222  As he had 
done in Betts, Black directly invoked Powell v. Alabama to support his 
argument that the indigent’s right to counsel was fundamental.223  This 
parity of reasoning and authority in argument, as well as literal reversal 
of result, confirm that Gideon effectively redeemed Black’s Betts 
dissent.  Black’s failure to cite his own previous dissent does not weaken 
this conclusion.  Instead, the lack of citation provides more evidence 
that a pure citation-based method of evaluating influence is inadequate. 
 
215. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 456–57 (1942). 
216. Id. at 457. 
217. Id. at 465–66 & n.14 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). 
218. Id. at 461–62 & n.10 (citing, inter alia, Hurtado, Maxwell, Twining, Snyder, and 
Palko).  Compare id., with Fig.5, infra p.1311. 
219. Id. 316 U.S. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  In a 
footnote, Black cites to the first Justice Harlan’s dissents (although not using Harlan’s name) 
in Twining and Maxwell to support his incorporation proposition.  Id. at 474–75 n.1. 
220. Id. at 475–76 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). 
221. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts).  The enduring 
importance of Gideon is that its recognition of a fundamental right to counsel led directly to 
the creation and proliferation of public defender systems across the nation. 
222. Id. at 344. 
223. Id. at 344–45 (quoting the “moving words of Justice Sutherland in Powell v. 
Alabama”). 
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Yet our non-citation based account of the development of 
incorporation doctrine would be similarly inadequate if it rested solely 
on the connection between Betts and Gideon.  As seen in Figure 4, in 
between Betts and Gideon came Adamson.  It was in his magisterial 
Adamson dissent that Justice Black offered his full-throated defense of 
incorporation that later proved so influential.  Decided in 1947, 
Adamson concerned a death-sentenced defendant who had declined to 
testify at his murder trial.224  The prosecutor commented negatively upon 
this silence, which the defendant argued violated the privilege against 
self-incrimination.225  Writing for the majority, Justice Stanley Reed held 
that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination did not 
apply to the states, affirming the line of cases beginning with Hurtado in 
1884 and including 1905’s Twining.226  Black famously dissented, filling 
the reporters with 24 pages of historical analysis and a 31 page 
appendix.227  In so doing, Black declared his allegiance to a prior 
tradition of “vigorous dissents that have been written in almost every 
case where the Twining and Hurtado doctrines have been applied.”228 
As Justice Alito later recognized in McDonald, the theory of “total 
incorporation” advanced by Black in his Adamson dissent never quite 
prevailed in the Court’s jurisprudence.229  However, Black sparked an 
intense debate and defended a radical position that created space for an 
eventual compromise.230  The incorporation discourse after Adamson 
certainly took twists and turns before Black’s particular dream of total 
incorporation succumbed to the reality of selective incorporation.  By 
the time of Gideon in 1963, the vibrant constitutional conversation 
featured many voices and Figure 4 could just as easily show other 
 
224. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 48–49 (1947). 
225. See id. 
226. See id. at 54 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)).  Although Justice 
Reed’s opinion for the Court did not specifically invoke Hurtado, Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence did.  See id. at 65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 
U.S. 516 (1884), as a “great opinion[]” part of the “heritage of the past”). 
227. See generally id. at 68–123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
228. Id. at 84 (Black, J., dissenting).  In this passage, Black is specifically referring to 
cases where the Twining and Hurtado doctrines were employed to strike down state 
regulatory laws.  Id.  The dissents cited here include many of those featured in Figure 1.  
Compare id. at 83 n.12, with Fig.1, supra p.1258. 
229. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
230. For a useful summary of the debate sparked by Black, see McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 nn.9–10 (2010). 
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opinions to the path from Adamson to Gideon.231  Yet additional data 
points would not undermine the basic picture of Black’s impressive 
doctrinal influence over the modern era.  The essential tradition of 
strong incorporation championed by Black in Betts and Adamson fairly 
well prevailed in Gideon, was followed in Malloy and Duncan, and was 
adhered to in McDonald. 
B.  Early Era Triumph: Redeeming Harlan (I) in Powell v. Alabama 
 
Figure 4.1. 
When Black advanced his theory of incorporation in Betts and 
Adamson, he relied on two seemingly distinct lines of authority.  First, 
he invoked a line where Court majorities had found due process 
protection for rights contained in the Bill of Rights—most pertinently 
1932’s Powell v. Alabama and 1897’s Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.  
 
231. For example, an even more detailed map would include earlier dissents by Justice 
Brennan that articulated his selective incorporation theory.  See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. 
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 263 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 
(1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
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This particular majority line, however, did not stand alone and had been 
limited and restricted by anti-incorporation majority opinions in 
criminal procedure cases in the Hurtado–Twining line.232  Thus, Black 
also invoked a second line of authority—though not precedential—to 
support his incorporation argument.  That second line was constituted 
by “vigorous dissents” in the Hurtado–Twining line, most especially the 
“powerful argument in the dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan.”233 
Singling out Justice Harlan for praise made perfect sense since his 
dissenting opinions in Hurtado, Maxwell, and Twining constitute the 
earliest defenses of incorporation under the Due Process Clause.  What 
most commentators overlook, however, is that Justice Harlan also wrote 
the majority opinion in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Court’s 
earliest incorporation case.234  Harlan’s under-the-radar achievement in 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy gave the pro-incorporation school an 
invaluable toehold in legitimate precedent.  Remarkably, this toehold 
helped justify the historic decision in Powell v. Alabama, which 
recognized a due process right to counsel in capital cases enforceable 
against the states.235  Powell marked the first time a criminal procedure 
right was incorporated and signaled the redemption of Harlan’s Hurtado 
dissent.  Thus, both of Black’s ostensibly distinct lines of supporting 
authority in Adamson ultimately derived from the same tradition 
initiated by Justice Harlan in dissent. 
Once again, establishing the genealogical connections to prove this 
claim requires more than attention to citation.  To grasp the full story, 
we must begin with the majority opinion in Hurtado and show how it set 
up an interpretative paradigm that would have made incorporation 
impossible.  Then we turn to Harlan’s attack on this paradigm, its 
 
232. See supra note 226.  The Hurtado–Twining line effectively limited Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy.  As explored infra pp. 1315–17, the reach of Powell v. Alabama was 
limited by Snyder and Palko. 
233. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 47, 84, 87 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).  Here 
Black is specifically referring to Harlan’s Twining dissent.  In his Appendix, however, Black 
also cited the “vigorous dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan” in Hurtado, Maxwell, and 
Twining.  Id. at 123. 
234. That Chicago, Burlington & Quincy qualifies as the Court’s first due process 
incorporation case is uncontroversial. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3035 n.12 (noting that 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy is the earliest incorporation case listed in footnote cataloging 
all incorporation decisions); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 
YALE L.J. 637, 653 (1989).  Of course, not all scholars overlook Harlan’s role in Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy.  See, e.g., Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the 
Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1503 (2000). 
235. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1932). 
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apparent success in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, and its partial 
redemption in Powell v. Alabama. 
Decided in 1884, Hurtado concerned the prosecution of a capital 
murder case based solely upon an information filed by the district 
attorney without presentment or indictment before a grand jury.236  The 
Fifth Amendment clearly prohibited this practice federally and so the 
question became whether the prohibition would apply against the States 
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.237  Justice 
Stanley Matthews’ majority opinion is a classic exposition of due 
process.  After a scholarly survey of the concept from the Magna Carta 
to the current day, Matthews posited due process as an evolving 
understanding responsive to “new and various experiences of our own 
situation.”238  In what became an enduring formulation, Matthews finally 
described due process as “th[e] law of the land in each State . . . exerted 
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”239  Though 
Matthews’ rhetoric promoted vigorous protection of individual rights, 
he nonetheless concluded that indictment by grand jury was not a 
necessary requirement of due process.240  Hurtado lost; his death 
sentence was affirmed. 
Matthews justified this result without reference to the extensive 
precedent or history he had surveyed.241  Instead, he reasoned by a 
painfully simple syllogism.  For his major premise, Matthews stated, 
“According to a recognized canon of interpretation . . . we are forbidden 
to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any part of [the 
Fifth] amendment is superfluous.”242  For his minor premise, Matthews 
pointed out that the phrase “due process of law” appears alongside the 
 
236. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520 (1884). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 531.  For Matthews’ survey of the historical meanings of due process, see id. 
at 521–30. 
239. Id. at 535.  The Court immediately picked up on this formulation and continues to 
use it to this day.  See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1, 32 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that Hurtado introduced “‘fundamental 
justice’ [to] the due process lexicon”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 102 (1908). 
240. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534–35, 538. 
241. Matthews’ historical survey and analysis of precedent unfolds over thirteen pages of 
the U.S. Reporter.  See id. at 521–34.  His syllogism occurs over a single page and cites no 
authority whatsoever.  See id. at 534. 
242. Id. 
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Fifth’s Amendment’s “specific and express provision for perpetuating 
the institution of the grand jury.”243  From these premises, the “natural 
and obvious inference is, that in the sense of the Constitution, ‘due 
process of law’ was not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the 
institution and procedure of a grand jury.”244  Finally, Matthews added 
that if it had been part of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“to perpetuate the institution of the grand jury in all the States, it would 
have embodied, as did the Fifth Amendment, express declarations to 
that effect.”245 
In dissent, Justice Harlan bristled at Matthews’ deduction. “This line 
of argument,” stated Harlan, “would lead to results which are 
inconsistent with the vital principles of republican government.”246  
Harlan reasoned that if the presence of “due process” along-side a 
specific provision for grand juries in capital cases in the Fifth 
Amendment necessarily meant that grand juries were excluded from 
due process, then 
 
inexorable logic would require it to be, likewise, held that the 
right not to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb for the same 
offence, nor compelled in a criminal case to testify against one’s 
self—rights and immunities also specifically recognized in the 
Fifth Amendment—were not protected by that due process of 
law . . . .247 
 
Harlan further argued that the same “inexorable logic” would also 
exclude from due process “the right of persons to just compensation for 
private property taken for public use,” the rights of the accused secured 
under the Sixth Amendment, and even the right to a petit jury.248  In 
other words, the majority’s logic would prevent all incorporation claims. 
According to Harlan, this unjust implication of Matthews’ syllogism 
both invalidated the logic and contradicted the idea that due process 
protected “fundamental principles of liberty and justice.”249  Instead of 




245. Id. at 535. 
246. Id. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
247. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
248. Id. at 548 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
249. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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that the provision of due process of law constituted an additional layer 
of protection for liberty and property.250  On his reading, this additional 
protection included the right to a grand jury indictment in capital 
cases.251 
Thirteen years later, the Court confronted a question that Harlan 
had specifically identified as one answered by the Hurtado majority’s 
“inexorable logic.”  Decided in 1897, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
concerned whether a railroad company was entitled under the Due 
Process Clause to “just compensation” for private property taken for 
public use.252  Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court, which 
held that due process prohibits States from taking private property for 
public use without just compensation.253  This result flew in the face of 
the no-superfluous-language reasoning in Hurtado since the Takings 
Clause also appears along-side the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.254  Given this, and despite its obvious relevance, it perhaps 
comes as no surprise that Harlan in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
utterly failed to cite to Hurtado.255 
Yet Harlan’s Chicago, Burlington & Quincy opinion evidently 
attacked the Hurtado majority sub silentio.  Harlan argued for an 
expansive, substantive conception of due process, emphasizing that “[i]n 
determining what is due process of law regard must be had to substance, 
not to form.”256  Just as his prior dissent had described grand jury 
indictment in capital cases as a fundamental principle of liberty,257 
 
250. Id. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
251. Id. at 550–51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 
(1857)).  In Robbins, Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
confronted whether due process of law included indictment by grand jury and concluded that 
it did.  See id. 
252. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897). 
253. Id. at 241 (“In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized by 
statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under its direction for public use, 
without compensation made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, 
wanting in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).  Although 
Harlan vindicated the due process principle, his opinion nonetheless held that the one dollar 
nominal compensation paid the railroad company was “just compensation.”  See id. at 257–58.  
Writing in dissent, Justice Brewer agreed with the general due process principle, but opined 
that the nominal compensation did not meet due process standards.  Id. at 259 (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). 
254. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
255. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 228–58. 
256. Id. at 235. 
257. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 558 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
16 - STARGER (DO NOT DELETE) 7/9/2012  10:10 PM 
2012] EXILE ON MAIN STREET 1307 
Harlan’s later opinion characterized protection of property rights as “a 
vital principle of republican institutions.”258  In both cases, Harlan found 
the justification for due process protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in longstanding traditions honoring the practice at issue.259  
This analytical resonance as well as the obvious identity of author and 
doctrinal result explains the hermeneutic connection between the two 
opinions posited in Figure 4. 
Harlan’s success in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy in quietly pushing 
his Hurtado analysis in the takings realm did not extend to criminal 
procedure cases.  In 1900, the Court held in Maxwell that a petit jury 
composed of eight people did not violate due process despite the Sixth 
Amendment’s requirement of twelve jurors.260  The majority primarily 
relied on Hurtado to justify its decision.261  Harlan dissented, relying on 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy as authority and also citing his own 
Hurtado dissent.262  Eight years later in Twining, the Court ruled that the 
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in state prosecutions 
and again relied, in part, on Hurtado.263  Harlan again dissented.264  
Although this time Harlan did not directly cite to his own prior 
opinions, he nonetheless advanced his traditional arguments in favor of 
incorporation.265 
 
258. Chi., Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. at 235–36. 
259. Compare id. at 235–41, with Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 550–57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
The tradition of grand jury indictments in capital cases extends back to the Magna Charta and 
appears older than the tradition of just compensation for takings. 
260. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602–03 (1900). 
261. Id. at 603 (“Trial by jury has never been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due 
process of law.  In not one of the cases cited and commented upon in the Hurtado case is a 
trial by jury mentioned as a necessary part of such process.”). 
262. See id. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 166 U.S. 
at 233)); id. at 606 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (recalling his Hurtado dissent and adhering to views 
expressed therein). 
263. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (citing Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 
528); see also id. at 106 (“The power of the people of the States to make and alter their laws at 
pleasure is the greatest security for liberty and justice, this court has said in Hurtado.” 
(citation omitted)). 
264. See id. at 114 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
265. The absence of direct citation explains why the arrow in Figure 4 connecting 
Harlan’s Twining dissent to his prior Maxwell dissent is dotted.  In Twining, Harlan 
emphasized self-incrimination as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship.  See, e.g., id. 
at 122 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  However, he nonetheless adopted the essential position that 
the Fourteenth Amendment, by due process or privileges and immunities, incorporated the 
Bill of Rights against the states:  
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This brings us at last to Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court’s 
1932 decision in the infamous Scottsboro Boys case.266  The young black 
defendants in Powell stood convicted of raping two white girls and faced 
death sentences.267  Before the Court, the defendants generally argued 
that the proceedings below suffered from profound prejudice and 
intimidation.  Their legal claim was that they had been denied the 
assistance of counsel and that this violated due process of law.268  This 
squarely presented the doctrinal question of “whether the denial of the 
assistance of counsel contravenes the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.”269 
Writing for a seven-justice majority, Justice George Sutherland first 
considered the facts. The trial court proceedings took place in “an 
atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment,” wrote 
Sutherland.270  Although counsel was eventually assigned hours before 
trial, the appointment was “little more than an expansive gesture” such 
that “[u]nder the circumstances disclosed . . . defendants were not 
accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.”271  Turning to the 
Fourteenth Amendment question, Sutherland proposed to test 
“whether due process of law has been accorded in given instances” by 
looking to English “settled usages and modes of proceeding . . . before 
the Declaration of Independence” so long as those settled usages and 
modes suited “the civil and political conditions of our ancestors by 
having been followed in this country after it became a nation.”272  Under 
 
 
The privileges and immunities mentioned in the original Amendments, and 
universally regarded as our heritage of liberty and from the common law, were thus 
secured [by the Fourteenth Amendment] to every citizen of the United States . . . 
and due process of law, in all public proceedings affecting life, liberty or property, 
were enjoined equally upon the Nation and the States.   
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
266. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  Of course, the profound racial and regional 
divisions exposed by the Scottsboro Boys episode implicate discourses and institutions well 
beyond incorporation and the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park 
Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 
1321–25, 1335 (2004). 
267. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 49–50. 
268. See id. at 50. 
269. Id. at 60. 
270. Id. at 51. 
271. Id. at 56, 58. 
272. Id. at 65 (citing Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896)). 
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this test, held Sutherland, due process “has not been met in the present 
case.”273 
Critically, Sutherland did not end his analysis there.  He continued: 
“We do not overlook . . . Hurtado, where this court determined that due 
process of law does not require an indictment by a grand jury as a 
prerequisite to prosecution by a state for murder.”274  Sutherland then 
quoted Justice Matthews’ entire Hurtado syllogism that excluded grand-
jury indictment from due process under the canon precluding 
superfluous language.275  Since the Sixth Amendment explicitly provides 
for the assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, conceded 
Sutherland: 
 
In the face of the reasoning of the Hurtado case, if it stood alone, 
it would be difficult to justify the conclusion that the right to 
counsel, being thus specifically granted by the Sixth 
Amendment, was also within the intendment of the due process 
of law clause.  But the Hurtado case does not stand alone.  In the 
later case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 
this court held that . . . private property . . . taken for public use 
without just compensation, was in violation of the due process of 
law required by the Fourteenth Amendment, notwithstanding 
that the Fifth Amendment explicitly declares that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation.276 
 
After surveying cases that followed Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 
Sutherland concluded that “[t]hese later cases establish that 
notwithstanding the sweeping character of the language in the Hurtado 
case, the rule laid down is not without exceptions.”277  This conclusion 
signaled the redemption of Harlan’s Hurtado dissent as the Hurtado 
 
273. Id. 
274. Id. (citation omitted). 
275. Id. at 65–66 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884)). See also 
supra notes 242–245 and accompanying text. 
276. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). 
277. Id. at 67.  The cases surveyed all essentially incorporated against the states via due 
process First Amendment speech and press liberties.  See id. (citing Stromberg v. California, 
283 U.S. 359 (1931); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652 (1925)).  The place of these cases in our incorporation story is discussed supra note 163. 
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majority’s “inexorable logic” has since played no part in incorporation 
jurisprudence.278 
It bears repeating that Harlan’s redemption here occurred without 
citation to his dissent.  And while Sutherland did plainly rely on 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, he followed the usual convention of 
referring to the holding of “the Court” and did not mention Harlan as 
the author of that critical opinion.  Yet Harlan’s authority undeniably 
plays a starring role in Powell v. Alabama’s doctrinal story.  This 
demonstrates the profoundly inter-textual nature of doctrine: the 
meaning of a single opinion cannot be understood by parsing that single 
text alone.  Thus Justice Black’s subsequent citation to Powell v. 
Alabama in Gideon must also be understood as invoking an entire 
tradition of dissents beginning with Harlan in Hurtado and continuing 
through to Black’s own dissents in Betts and Adamson.  These dissents 
kept alive the dream of applying the Bill of Rights against the States and 
provided the intellectual ammunition for maintaining this dream.  They 
helped construct the context for an evolving tradition supporting 
incorporation. 
 
278. The redemption is partial since the Hurtado holding that grand jury indictment is 
not required in state prosecutions has never been overruled.  See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct 3020, 3035 n.13 (2010)). 
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C.  Fighting for the Future: Stevens’ Strange McDonald Dissent 
 
Figure 5. 
 The tradition generally opposed to incorporation is represented in 
Figure 5 above.  Note that all the connections rendered are directly 
supported by citation.  My thesis that uncited dissents influence 
doctrine, therefore, cannot be advanced through study of this map.  
However, a brief survey of the territory not yet explored is necessary to 
complete the doctrinal story of incorporation.  In addition, analysis of 
Justice Stevens’ final dissent for the Court in McDonald reveals the 
deeper connection between incorporation and SDP doctrine writ large.  
To these two tasks I turn after laying out the genealogical data behind 
Figure 5. 
In chronological order, the opinions in Figure 5 are: Hurtado v. 
California (Justice Stanley Matthews for the Court, 1884);279 Twining v. 
New Jersey (Justice William Moody for the Court, 1908);280 Snyder v. 
 
279. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516.  For vote break-down, see supra note 165 
and accompanying text. 
280. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).  For vote break-down, see supra note 
168 and accompanying text. 
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Massachusetts (Justice Benjamin Cardozo for the Court, 1934);281 Palko 
v. Connecticut (Justice Cardozo for the Court, 1937);282 Betts v. Brady 
(Justice Owen Roberts for the Court, 1942);283 Adamson v. California 
(Justice Stanley Reed for the Court, 1947);284 Malloy v. Hogan (Justice 
John Marshall Harlan dissenting, 1964);285 Duncan v. Louisiana (Justice 
Harlan dissenting, 1968);286 McDonald v. City of Chicago (Justice John 
Paul Stevens dissenting, 2010).287  In genealogical order, the direct 
citations in this line are: McDonald (Stevens)→ Duncan (Harlan);288 
Duncan (Harlan)→ Malloy (Harlan);289 Malloy (Harlan)→ Palko 
(Cardozo);290 Adamson (Reed)→ Palko (Cardozo);291 Betts (Roberts)→ 
Palko (Cardozo);292 Palko (Cardozo)→ Snyder (Cardozo);293 Snyder 
 
281. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).  Snyder was a 5–4 decision.  Justice 
Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 102.  Justice Owen Roberts dissented, and 
Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, and Butler concurred in his opinion.  Id. at 123, 138 (Roberts, 
J., dissenting). 
282. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).  Palko was an 8–1 decision.  Justice 
Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 320.  Justice Butler dissented without 
opinion.  Id. at 329. 
283. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 465 (1942).  For vote break-down, see supra note 170 and 
accompanying text. 
284. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).  For vote break-down, see supra note 
171 and accompanying text. 
285. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  For vote break-
down, see supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
286. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  For vote 
break-down, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
287. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  For vote break-down, see supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
288. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3095, 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Harlan’s dissent 
in Duncan).  Stevens also repeatedly cites to other Harlan dissents that sound similar themes, 
including Malloy.  Id. at 3092. 
289. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172, 173 & n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that “I have 
raised my voice many times before against the Court’s continuing undiscriminating insistence 
upon fastening on the States federal notions of criminal justice” and citing his own dissent in 
Malloy). 
290. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is equally plain that the line of 
cases exemplified by Palko . . . furnishes no general theoretical framework for what the Court 
does today.” (citation omitted)). 
291. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947) (“We reaffirm the conclusion of the 
Twining and Palko cases that protection against self-incrimination is not a privilege or 
immunity of national citizenship.”); see also id. at 62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (singling out 
Cardozo and Palko for praise). 
292. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461–62 & n.10 (1942) (“The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . .” (footnote 
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(Cardozo)→ Twining (Moody);294 Snyder (Cardozo)→ Hurtado 
(Matthews);295 Twining (Moody)→ Hurtado (Matthews).296 
Recall the conclusions from the previous subsection that (a) Powell 
v. Alabama redeemed Harlan’s dissent in Hurtado; and that (b) Black’s 
subsequent invocation of Powell in Gideon was hermeneutically 
connected to the dissenting tradition that extended from Harlan to 
Black’s own dissents in Betts and Adamson.  These conclusions beg the 
question as to how the pro-incorporation school ended up in dissent in 
Betts and Adamson after its apparent victory in Powell.  The answer to 
this question lies in an analysis of two highly influential opinions by 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo—1934’s Snyder and 1937’s Palko.  In these 
tradition-defining opinions, Cardozo specifically sought to reclaim the 
doctrine of Hurtado and Twining that had been imperiled by Powell. 
Decided in 1934, Snyder considered whether a due process 
confrontation right was violated by the denial of a criminal defendant’s 
request to accompany the jury to a crime-scene visit initiated by the 
prosecution.297  Over strong dissent, Cardozo classified the crime-scene 
visit as a “view,” held that the absence of a defendant at a view did not 
contravene any “immutable principles of justice” required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and affirmed the death sentence.298  Cardozo 
concluded his Snyder opinion with a stern warning against excessive 
liberalism in criminal procedure: 
 
omitted) (citing Palko among other cases)). 
293. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder for the proposition 
that due process protects “‘principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental’”). 
294. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (citing Twining for the proposition 
that due process only protects principles of justice deeply rooted in tradition). 
295. Id. (citing Hurtado for proposition that due process only protects principles of 
justice deeply rooted in tradition). 
296. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (discussing Justice Matthews’ 
opinion in Hurtado). 
297. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 103–05. 
298. See id. at 122.  Cardozo somewhat fudged the Sixth Amendment incorporation 
issue presented in this case.  On the one hand, he identified the Sixth Amendment privilege of 
confronting one’s accusers and cross-examining them and “assume[d] that the privilege is 
reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 106.  On the other hand, he intimated that 
a federal court might find a Sixth Amendment violation on the facts presented, id. at 116, but 
found no due process violation.  Id. at 117.  Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion made clear the 
view that the Sixth Amendment privilege had been violated and that this privilege should 
inhere in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 128–32 (Roberts, J., dissenting).  For more 
on Roberts’ important dissent, see infra Part V. 
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There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into 
contempt—that discredit will even touch the great immunities 
assured by the Fourteenth Amendment—if gossamer 
possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence 
pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to 
local law, and set the guilty free.299 
 
With this call to respect local variations in state procedural practices, 
Cardozo explicitly sought to prevent the Court from “travel[ling] far 
away from the doctrine of Hurtado v. California and Twining v. New 
Jersey.”300  Of course, it was precisely the Hurtado doctrine (if not also 
Twining) that Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion in Powell v. 
Alabama had undermined just two years prior to Snyder.301 
Three years later, Palko picked up where Snyder left off.  This time, 
instead of five votes, Justice Cardozo commanded eight.  Palko affirmed 
a Connecticut man’s death sentence after he had twice been tried for 
murder.302  After the first trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the second degree and imposed a life sentence.303  The state 
appealed, won a reversal, tried the defendant a second time, and secured 
a death sentence.304  Under federal law, this would have constituted 
double jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.305  Cardozo 
nonetheless held the practice afforded the defendant due process based 
on a simple principle of “symmetry”—since the defendant would be 
allowed an appeal of error, so too should the State.306  Together with his 
opinion in Snyder, Palko took the wind out of Powell’s incorporation 
sails and set precedent against giving criminal defendants the rigorous 
procedural protections recognized in the Bill of Rights.307 
 
299. Id. at 122. 
300. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
301. On Powell’s abrogation of Hurtado, see supra notes 277–278 and accompanying 
text. 
302. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 320–21, 329 (1937). 
303. Id. at 321. 
304. Id. at 321–22. 
305. See id. at 322–23 (citing Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904)). 
306. Id. at 328. 
307. Cardozo’s strategy did not go unnoticed by the Snyder dissents that quoted Powell’s 
analysis of Hurtado at length.  See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 133–35 (1934) 
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Powell). 
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The story of how Justice Black subsequently overcame Cardozo’s 
reaction through a pro-incorporation campaign initiated in his Betts and 
Adamson dissents has already been told.  As emphasized, Black found 
authority and inspiration for his campaign in the opinions of the first 
Justice Harlan.  It is a great genealogical irony then that the second 
Justice Harlan provided the staunchest resistance to Black’s 
incorporation project.  Though they both campaigned in dissent, Harlan 
the grandson championed the opposite cause of Harlan the grandfather.  
Importantly though, the contours of the incorporation debate had 
changed between generations.  Harlan II did not flatly oppose all 
applications of the Bill of Rights against the States nor did he try to 
resurrect Matthews’ logic from Hurtado.  Rather, as Justice Alito put it 
in McDonald, Harlan “fought a determined rearguard action to preserve 
the two-track approach” to incorporation.308  This two-track approach 
advocated variable protection between state rights protected by due 
process and federal rights protected by the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution.  Harlan’s approach presented an interesting blend of 
Cardozo-like skepticism towards criminal defendants and a progressive 
understanding of due process as an evolving concept. 
The blend is first exemplified by Harlan’s dissent in Malloy.  
Decided in 1964, Malloy examined whether a Connecticut man’s 
imprisonment for refusal to answer questions in a state gambling 
violated due process.309  In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan 
held that due process incorporated both the Fifth Amendment’s 
privilege against self-incrimination and the applicable federal standard 
for finding a violation.310  Harlan disagreed.  Though the “development 
of the community’s sense of justice may in time lead to expansion of the 
protection which due process affords,” proper development is “short-
circuited by the simple device of incorporating into due process . . . the 
whole body of law which surrounds a specific prohibition directed 




308. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010) (collecting Harlan 
concurrences and dissents). 
309. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964). 
310. Id.  This holding overruled Twining and Adamson.  See id. at 6. 
311. Id. at 15–16 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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all relevant differences which may exist between state and 
federal criminal law and its enforcement.  The ultimate result is 
compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent with the purpose of 
our federal system and which is achieved either by 
encroachment on the States’ sovereign powers or by dilution in 
federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the 
Bill of Rights.312 
 
Beyond attacking jot-for-jot incorporation, Harlan also opined in 
Malloy that Connecticut decision comported with fundamental fairness, 
and that “under any standard—state or federal—the commitment for 
contempt was proper.”313 
Consider next Harlan’s dissent in Duncan.  Decided in 1968, Duncan 
concerned whether a young Louisiana man’s conviction for simple 
assault, obtained before a judge despite a requested jury trial, violated 
due process of law.314  By this time, the selective incorporation train had 
gathered a full head of steam and Justice White’s majority opinion held 
that due process “guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases 
which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”315  Harlan dissented, noting that “I have 
raised my voice many times before against the Court’s continuing 
undiscriminating insistence upon fastening on the States federal notions 
of criminal justice.”316  For Harlan, the Court’s incorporation approach 
“put[s] the States in a constitutional straitjacket with respect to their 
own development in the administration of criminal or civil law.”317  He 
advocated instead a “more discriminating process of adjudication” that 
exhibited “constitutional tolerance for state experimentation.”318  On the 
 
312. Id. at 16–17 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
313. Id. at 32 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
314. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 146–47 (1968). 
315. Id. at 149.  See also supra note 203 and accompanying text for discussion of the due 
process standard articulated by Justice White and later embraced by Justice Alito in 
McDonald. 
316. Id. at 173 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Malloy, 378 U.S. at 14 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)).  Harlan’s citation to his Malloy dissent here is represented as a solid arrow in 
Figure 5. 
317. Id. at 175–76 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
318. Id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Harlan actually closes his dissent with an ode to 
the idea of state experimentation and quotes from Justice Brandeis’ celebrated dictum: “It is, 
he said, ‘one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .’”  Id. at 193 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration 
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particular jury question, Harlan argued that the “jury trial is not a 
requisite of due process” because it is not “the only fair means of 
resolving issues of fact.”319 
This brings us to Justice Stevens’ strange dissent in McDonald.  
After thirty-five years on the Court and more than his share of 
important dissents, this forty-two page opinion constituted Stevens’ final 
word in dissent.320  As shown in Figure 5, Justice Stevens explicitly 
invoked Harlan’s incorporation dissents in this epic case.321  Harlan 
directly supported Stevens’ argument that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“‘stands . . . on its own bottom’”322 and that due process applies directly 
to the States “without intermediate reliance on any of the first eight 
Amendments.”323  Echoing Harlan, Stevens endorsed the “‘two-track 
approach’” as one promoting federalism and state experimentation.324  
Instead of selective incorporation, Stevens described the proper due 
process test in Cardozo’s terms: whether a challenged state practice 
“violates values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”325  Under 
this test, Stevens concluded that petitioners opposing the handgun 
regulations ostensibly at issue had “failed to show why their asserted 
 
in original) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting)).  Here we see Harlan both invoking a proud prior dissenting tradition and 
attempting to tar the majority with charges of an inflexible conception of due process akin to 
Lochnerism. 
319. Id. at 186–87. 
320. Perhaps most impressive among Justice Stevens’ many dissents is his opinion in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, which was explicitly redeemed in Lawrence v. Texas.  See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy law: “Justice Stevens’ analysis, 
in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here. . . .  Bowers v. 
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
321. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3092 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (citing Malloy, 378 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 3093 n.11 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I can hardly improve upon the many passionate defenses of this 
position [holding state and federal governments to different standards] that Justice Harlan 
penned during his tenure on the Court.” (citation omitted)). 
322. Id. at 3093 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
323. Id. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
324. See, e.g., id. at 3094–95 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court, id. at 3046, and 
citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
Here Stevens cites to the same famous Brandeis dissent for the same rhetorical purposes that 
Harlan did in Duncan.  See supra text accompanying note 318. 
325. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  Following Harlan again, Stevens locates himself in 
the incorporation tradition of Justice Cardozo. 
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interest is intrinsic to the concept of ordered liberty or vulnerable to 
maltreatment in the political arena.”326 
The reason I call Stevens’ dissent strange is that he explicitly sided 
with conservative dissents in criminal procedure cases—Malloy and 
Duncan—where he most certainly agreed with the liberal results 
upholding strong double-jeopardy and jury-trial rights for criminal 
defendants.  Indeed, the greater irony is that McDonald seemingly led 
Stevens to align himself with the conservative dissents of the Warren 
Court while Alito and the plurality embraced the Warren Court’s liberal 
majorities.327  This tension perhaps explains Stevens’ odd combination in 
McDonald of both embracing Harlan’s dissents and attempting to 
distinguish the Warren Court incorporation cases.  He thus suggested 
that selective incorporation only applied in criminal procedure cases 
where the “need for certainty and uniformity is more pressing, and the 
margin for error slimmer.”328  Since the Second Amendment advances a 
non-procedural right, according to Stevens, its status under due process 
should not be governed by criminal procedural principles.329  While this 
attempt at category distinction based on substantive versus procedural 
rights has natural appeal, Stevens’ argument makes no sense given that 
he proposed to adopt the “basic [due process] inquiry . . . described by 
Justice Cardozo more than 70 years ago [in Palko].”330  As we have seen, 
Cardozo used this “basic inquiry” in Palko precisely to deny the 
expansion of criminal procedure rights—just as he had done in Snyder 
and just as Harlan advocated in Malloy and Duncan. 
This apparent contradiction is best understood by not reading 
Stevens’ dissent literally.  By this I mean that though Stevens ostensibly 
addressed the incorporation issues in McDonald, his clear concern was 
actually with broader substantive due process doctrine.  In other words, 
Stevens’ dissent is best read not as a coherent argument against Second 
Amendment incorporation in particular but rather as a grand lesson on 
substantive due process analysis and constitutional interpretation writ 
 
326. Id. at 3116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
327. Stevens himself apparently recognized this irony, though he understandably sought 
to emphasize the plurality’s doctrinal hypocrisy rather than his own: “[I]f some 1960’s 
opinions purported to establish a general method of incorporation, that hardly binds us in this 
case.  The Court has not hesitated to cut back on perceived Warren Court excesses in more 
areas than I can count.”  Id. at 3095 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
328. Id. at 3094 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
329. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
330. Id. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Palko, 302 U.S. at 325). 
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large.331  On this reading, the incorporation debate is secondary, if not 
entirely irrelevant, to Stevens’ parting lecture on the “conceptual core” 
of substantive due process analysis, which primarily implicates questions 
of “[s]elf-determination, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, 
intimate relationships, political equality, dignity and respect.”332  In this 
broader arena, Stevens engages in a pitched battle with his conservative 
colleagues and their strict textualist and originalist methodologies.333  
Stevens’ dissent thus constitutes a rallying cry for a competing due 
process school that promotes the idea of a “living Constitution.”334 
Given this context, Stevens’ invocation of the second Justice Harlan 
and the anti-incorporation school makes perfect doctrinal sense.  In 
McDonald, Stevens advocated for understanding due process as a 
“dynamic concept.”335  As far back as Hurtado, opinions in the anti-
incorporation line have emphasized that due process cannot be strictly 
defined according to settled usage—to do so “would be to deny every 
quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or 
improvement.  It would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the 
unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.”336  
 
331. From the start, Stevens announces, “This is a substantive due process case.”  Id. at 
3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He then argues why the Due Process Clause applies to matters 
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.  Id. at 3090–91.  From here, he argues 
that “selective incorporation” is a “subset” of substantive due process doctrine.  Id. at 3093 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  After defending the “two-track” approach to 
incorporation, id. at 3093–95, Stevens then expounds his theory of substantive due process 
interpretation.  Id. at 3096–103.  Stevens’ dissent spans over fourteen pages before devoting 
any sustained attention to the Second Amendment issue. 
332. Id. at 3101 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
333. Stevens only briefly skirmishes with Justice Thomas when he describes Thomas’ 
campaign for radical change in privileges and immunities doctrine as animated by a desire to 
displace major portions of the Court’s equal protection and substantive due process 
jurisprudence.  Id. at 3089 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).  The conflict with Justice Scalia, by contrast, is epic.  
Scalia wrote a separate concurrence specifically to counter Stevens’ “broad condemnation of 
the theory of interpretation which underlies the Court’s opinion, a theory that makes the 
traditions of our people paramount.”  See id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring).  The back and 
forth between Scalia and Stevens defines the current state of the competing due process 
schools. 
334. See id. at 3057 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(describing Stevens as a “living Constitution” advocate). 
335. Id. at 3099 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 13, 38 
(1992)). 
336. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529; see also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 
78, 100 (1908) (“This court has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of [due 
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Stevens taps this traditional vein in his dissent and constructs a broader 
critique of a “wholly backward looking” or “rigid historical” approach 
to substantive due process that he argues characterizes the McDonald 
plurality’s approach.337  While previous stalwarts in the anti-
incorporation school used the idea of dynamism to oppose criminal 
procedure rights, Stevens used his dissent as a pulpit to preach a new 
direction for the old school. 
In his attempt to influence future doctrine, Stevens’ final dissent falls 
in line with the tradition of great due process dissents examined in this 
Article.  The proposition that a sophisticated understanding of Stevens’ 
dissent requires reading context more than text falls in line with the 
argument presented that doctrine unfolds through a dialectic that 
cannot be captured by citation alone.  Figure 6 below338 illustrates the 
specific picture of the doctrinal push and pull between competing 
schools in the incorporation genealogy.  Note that rival doctrinal lines 
cross three times.  First, the anti-incorporation lines from Snyder to 
Twining and Hurtado cross the pro-incorporation school’s early line of 
majority presence connecting Powell to Chicago Burlington & Quincy.  
Second, as the strong incorporation school falls back into dissent, the 
line from Black’s Betts dissent back to Powell crosses the anti-
incorporation school central axis between Snyder and Palko.  Finally, 
the incorporation school’s eventual victory in Gideon creates two 
crossings.  In majority territory, the Gideon–Powell line cuts across the 
Snyder–Palko axis.  In the realm of dissent, the hermeneutic link 
between Black’s Gideon majority and his own Adamson dissent crosses 
the line from Harlan’s dissent in Malloy back to the deposed king, 
Palko. 
Once again, it must be stressed that the doctrinal map here 
simplifies the territory represented.339  Yet the picture here is still 
complex and the multiple crossed lines suggest that incorporation 
doctrine evolved through a dialectic exchange between competing due 
 
process], and has preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the 
process of inclusion and exclusion . . . .”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 176–77 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 529). 
337. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3097–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
338. See infra App., at p.1328.  
339. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing omitted First 
Amendment cases), note 213 and accompanying text (discussing omission of Mapp v. Ohio 
and Wolf v. Colorado), and note 231 and accompanying text (discussing omission of Brennan 
opinions in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price and Cohen v. Hurley). 
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process traditions.  Those rival traditions themselves mutated over time 
as they encountered new arguments and reacted to new teachings and 
opinions.  Dissents played an integral role in this complex evolution.  
Besides challenging majority reasoning and sowing seeds for future 
overruling, dissents also pushed exiled traditions in new directions.  
Though not always cited, dissents more than held up their end of the 
constitutional conversation. 
V.  CONCLUSION: DISSENT AND DUE PROCESS BORDERS 
John Hart Ely once famously observed that “‘substantive due 
process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green pastel 
redness.’”340  Ely’s quip took, and it is now a commonplace to call SDP 
an oxymoron.341  Yet this SDP snub was never more than a clever play 
on words.  As noted earlier, “due process of law” is a phrase translated 
from Latin in the Magna Carta.342  The more literal translation of “per 
legem terræ” in the Magna Carta is “by the law of the land.”343  The 
substantive “law of the land” is hardly an oxymoron.  Neither is the 
procedural “law of the land” a redundancy.  Despite the underlying 
emptiness of Ely’s enduring joke, it is certainly true that neither the 
phrase “substantive due process” nor the phrase “procedural due 
process” (PDP) appear in the Constitution.  This then raises the 
question: where did SDP and PDP come from? 
It should come as no surprise that the answer to this question is—
dissents!  As it turns out, the exact phrase “procedural due process” first 
entered the Supreme Court lexicon in a dissent from the incorporation 
line, specifically Justice Owen Robert’s dissent in 1934’s Snyder.344  
Recall that Snyder concerned whether a criminal defendant had a due 
process right to confront witnesses against him like that guaranteed by 
 
340. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
18 (1980). 
341. See, e.g., Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion 
of Easterbrook, J.) (calling SDP an “oxymoron”); Ill. Psychol. Ass’n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 
1342 (7th Cir. 1987) (opinion of Posner, J.) (calling SDP a “durable oxymoron”).  
342. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
343. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
344. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 137 (1937) (Roberts, J., dissenting).  The 
proposition that this is the first use of the phrase “procedural due process” is confirmed 
through searching for that precise phrase on Westlaw or Lexis in the Supreme Court 
database.  Snyder is the earliest case retrieved where the phrase is used in the actual text of 
the opinion (not the Keycite or Headnote text). 
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the Sixth Amendment.  Cardozo held that due process did not imply 
such a right.  Roberts objected: 
 
A distinction has always been observed in the meaning of due 
process as affecting property rights, and as applying to procedure 
in the courts.  In the former aspect the requirement is satisfied if 
no actual injury is inflicted and the substantial rights of the 
citizen are not infringed; the result rather than the means of 
reaching it is the important consideration.  But where the 
conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not that a just result shall have been obtained, 
but that the result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair way.  
Procedural due process has to do with the manner of the trial; 
dictates that in the conduct of judicial inquiry certain 
fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard 
of those rules, and is not satisfied, though the result is just, if the 
hearing was unfair.345 
 
According to Roberts, the practice at issue in Snyder precisely violated 
this procedural due process.346  It is important to recognize that in this 
first reference to PDP, Roberts uses the phrase to argue for importing 
the right to confront witnesses through the Due Process Clause.  Today 
this would be thought of as an argument for SDP incorporation.  
However, for Roberts, the key distinction is that between conduct-of-
trial due process and “due process affecting property rights.”  In 
essence, Roberts is trying to distinguish the procedural protections 
found in the Sixth Amendment from the substantive protections for 
rights found in cases like Lochner and its progeny. 
Snyder was decided three years before West Coast Hotel ended 
Lochner’s reign.  The Court-packing crisis was not yet on the horizon 
and Roberts had yet to be cast as the “switch in time that saved nine.”  
But already we see the germs of a strategy for using Lochner as a foil 
when defining “good” due process from “bad.”  This strategy later 
flowered in the dissenting opinion of Justice Wiley Rutledge in 1948’s 
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, which marked the first time the 
phrase “substantive due process” was used in the text of a Court 
opinion.347 
 
345. Id. (emphasis added). 
346. Id. at 138. 
347. See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
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Republic Natural Gas concerned an appeal from an Oklahoma State 
Commission ordering Republic to pay money to another natural gas 
company for draining gas from a common pool.348  Republic argued it 
had a property right, protected by due process, to drain the gas.349  The 
Court majority, per Justice Frankfurter, held that there was no final 
judgment and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits.350  In 
dissent, Justice Rutledge argued that the merits were properly before 
the Court and that Republic actually had no protectable property 
interest.351  Rutledge denied that Republic had any right protected by 
“substantive due process” and observed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment “was not a strait jacket immobilizing state power to change 
or alter institutions of property in the public interest.”352  To support this 
proposition, Rutledge stated that previous cases that had given the 
Amendment expansive property protections “have failed to withstand 
the test of time” and specifically cited Lochner, Adkins, and then West 
Coast Hotel.353  By associating “substantive due process” with a 
renounced line of cases, Rutledge sought to divide due process into 
legitimate and illegitimate territories. 
Rutledge’s categorization highlights another important role dissents 
play in doctrinal development.  Beyond influencing the internal shape of 
SDP doctrines like economic liberty or incorporation, dissents also help 
construct external borders between rival due process territories.  
Dissents have introduced vocabulary and lines of argument that have 
distinguished PDP from SDP.  In McDonald, we observed Justice 
Stevens’ dissent contest the border between incorporation and other 
SDP doctrines.  Drawing lines between doctrines potentially limits the 
applicable scope of legal rules laid down by the majority.  This is simply 
another way that dissents offer rival interpretations of constitutional 
traditions and create a context in which majority text is read.  Whether 
 
dissenting).  As with “procedural due process,” the proposition that Republic Natural Gas 
produced the first use of the phrase “substantive due process” is confirmed through a 
Westlaw or Lexis search on “substantive due process” in the Supreme Court database.  
Republic Natural Gas is the earliest case retrieved where the phrase is used in the actual text 
of the opinion (not the Keycite or Headnote text). 
348. Id. at 63–67. 
349. Id. at 67. 
350. Id. at 72. 
351. Id. at 87–93 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
352. Id. at 90 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
353. Id. at 90 & n.23 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
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contested lines are between doctrines or within them, dissents advance 
the conversation about how best to draw them.  It is this complex and 
ever-evolving line-drawing conversation that ultimately gives shape to 
doctrine. 
In this Article, I have looked at the lines drawn by and through 
dissents in the economic liberty and incorporation territories of SDP 
doctrine.  As I have shown, drawing these lines cannot depend solely on 
the citations contained within opinion texts.  Dissents form doctrinal 
context, which is missed by an overly narrow reading of authority.  I 
have suggested a hermeneutic technique that allows links to be made 
between opinions when citation is not available.  This technique 
proceeds by dividing an area of doctrine into competing schools of 
thought and then constructing an opinion genealogy for each rival 
school.  These rival genealogies may be mapped—and maps give visual 
representation to the shape of doctrine. 
The technique was implemented to map economic liberty and 
incorporation doctrine.  Analysis of the genealogies of these competing 
schools confirmed that dissents played a vital role in the evolution of 
SDP bloodlines.  Without Bradley’s dissent in Slaughter-House, the SDP 
economic liberty school might never have risen.  Without Holmes’ 
Lochner dissent, the economic liberty line might not have fallen so 
quickly or so hard.  Similarly, incorporation could not have become a 
SDP doctrine without the efforts of Harlan (I) and his dissent in 
Hurtado, which initiated a tradition later rescued from exile by Justice 
Black after the redemption of his Adamson dissent.  The insight about 
the role of dissents in shaping the direction of schools of due process 
thoughts invites us to read Justice Stevens’ final dissent in McDonald 
not as a vigorous assault on incorporation, but rather as an attempt to 
shape the future of SDP doctrine more broadly conceived. 
In the end, I hope that the maps and genealogies presented have 
usefully complicated the foundational concept of tradition that lies at 
the heart of due process analysis.  The constant contest and debate over 
the existence and proper interpretation of our inherited customs and 
modes of legal proceeding demonstrate that no single doctrinal school 
can legitimately claim all of constitutional tradition.  The traditions and 
conscience of our society are not monolithic.  Whether conceived of as a 
living thing or strictly grounded in history, debates over the true 
meaning of tradition are inevitable in constitutional law.  And in this 
inevitable debate, due process dissents will always play a vital role in 
shaping the contours, vocabulary, and direction of argument. 
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 Figure 4. 
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Figure 6. 
 
